Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose-based reasoning as a cognitive default.

Abstract

Teleological explanations account for objects and events by reference to a functional consequence or purpose. Although they are popular in religion, they are unpopular in science: Physical scientists in particular explicitly reject them when explaining natural phenomena. However, prior research provides reasons to suspect that this explanatory form may represent a default explanatory preference. As a strong test of this hypothesis, we explored whether physical scientists endorse teleological explanations of natural phenomena when their information-processing resources are limited. In Study 1, physical scientists from top-ranked American universities judged explanations as true or false, either at speed or without time restriction. Like undergraduates and age-matched community participants, scientists demonstrated increased acceptance of unwarranted teleological explanations under speed despite maintaining high accuracy on control items. Scientists' overall endorsement of inaccurate teleological explanation was lower than comparison groups, however. In Study 2, we explored this further and found that the teleological tendencies of professional scientists did not differ from those of humanities scholars. Thus, although extended education appears to produce an overall reduction in inaccurate teleological explanation, specialization as a scientist does not, in itself, additionally ameliorate scientifically inaccurate purpose-based theories about the natural world. A religion-consistent default cognitive bias toward teleological explanation tenaciously persists and may have subtle but profound consequences for scientific progress.

Teleological reasoning about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives?

“…Does 'promiscuous' teleological reasoning index a deeprooted belief that natural kinds were intentionally created for a purpose [1][2][3][4][5]15]? We have suggested a new relational-deictic framework that takes into account a rich set of relations and perspectives among natural entities, that permits one to avoid cultural assumptions about the 'right way' to conceptualize nature, and that identifies the claim for 'intuitive theism' as a culturally-infused stance.…”

“…This is interpreted as evidence that young children and non-Western adults mistakenly believe that natural kinds, like artifacts, were designed to 'exist for a purpose'. On the PT view, this belief is eventually replaced, in Westerneducated older children and adults, with a more mature understanding that artifacts (but not natural kinds) are designed for a purpose [2][3][4][5]. The theory of PT, which also underlies the claim that people are 'intuitive theists' ('.…”

“…Although such reasoning is appropriate for certain domains (e.g., artifacts), it is considered promiscuous when extended to natural kinds because it implies 'agentive and intentional conceptualizations of Nature', where physical-causal mechanistic explanations would be superior ( [2], p. 8). To get a flavor for this kind of thinking, consider a standard teleological task ( [2][3][4][5]; example adapted from [5]). Participants are introduced to a pair of related entities (e.g., rainclouds, an animal) and asked why a particular relation between these entities exists (e.g., why there are many rainclouds in the animal's habitat).…”

“…live'). In others, participants are simply asked to judge the accuracy of teleo-functional explanations [2,6].…”

“…We outline major points of difference between these two accounts of teleological reasoning and offer evidence in support of a 'relational-deictic' framework. Finally, we discuss how the relational-deictic interpretation offers a new perspective on the role of teleological thinking in conceptual development and cultural cognition.'Promiscuous teleology': the intentional design stance According to the theory of 'promiscuous teleology' (PT) [1][2][3][4][5], statements such as 'clouds are for raining' reflect a deep-rooted belief that natural kinds are intentionally designed for a purpose. Although such reasoning is appropriate for certain domains (e.g., artifacts), it is considered promiscuous when extended to natural kinds because it implies 'agentive and intentional conceptualizations of Nature', where physical-causal mechanistic explanations would be superior ([2], p. 8).…”