Productive versus destructive efforts in contests

Amegashie, J. Atsu

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.05.005

Cited by 29 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In the third stage, each contestant determines his productive efforts in the contests. The second and the third stages are based on the model of Amegashie (). The expected utilities of the contestants (Stage 3) is a variation of the Tullock contest ().…”

Section: Model Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The proposed model has three stages and is an extension of the work of Amegashie (). In the first stage, the regulator sets the monitoring efforts on the contestants at the level of m i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.…”

Section: Model Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The conclusion is that effort in a contest can be either productive or destructive. Examples are deliberately dirty and illegal tricks (fouls) in a game of soccer or basketball, and time‐wasting techniques effected to substantially reduce, or make impossible, the ability of one's opponent to exert effort (Amegashie, ). This type of behavior is often against social norms, illegal, or costly (and often more than one of these), and therefore sabotage is typically an expensive strategy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The efforts of participants in contests can be productive or destructive. Such destructive effort or sabotage has been studied in the literature (e.g., Amegashie, ; Amegashie & Runkel, ; Chen, ; Epstein & Hefeker, ; Konrad, ; Kräkel, ; Lazear, ; Münster, ). In real life, there are many contest‐like cases where the contestants perform manipulations to improve their probability of winning the contest prize.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts

2018

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This paper considers a 3-stage contest with both sabotage and monitoring efforts that aim to reduce sabotage. In the first stage, the regulator sets his monitoring efforts for each contestant. In the second stage, each contestant determines his sabotaging efforts, based on the monitoring efforts that were imposed by the regulator. In the third stage, each contestant determines his productive efforts in the contest. The results supply a justification to exert monitoring efforts because these efforts may benefit both the contestants and the regulator (a win-win situation). Furthermore, the paper defines the conditions where exerting monitoring efforts would be worthwhile.

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Section: Model Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts

2018

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“…Cyber strike can indeed be viewed as a special kind of sabotage, as it directly reduces the effectiveness of conventional arms. Papers on sabotage include Konrad (), Chen (), Beviá and Corchón (), Muenster (), Amegashie () and Chang and Luo (), among others. Chowdhury and Gurtler () have provided a comprehensive review of the literature on contests and sabotage and a more extensive list of references.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber Technology and the Arms Race

Kanniainen

2019

German Economic Review

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Cyber technology represents digital military capability with the purpose of causing damage to the military strength of a potential enemy. War using conventional weapons may be preceded by a strike using cyber technology. This paper introduces such technology into the theory of conflicts. The cost of war relative to the payoff from victory turns out to be crucial for the results on armament decisions. In the war game, two types of Nash equilibria may arise. One is subject to warfare while the other is not (‘equilibrium of terror’), depending on the perceived cost of war. In a symmetric war game, cyber capabilities are neutral with respect to the investments in conventional weapons, but they make wars more likely. Asymmetric access to cyber technology limits the international arms race with conventional weapons. A low success probability in the cyber programme encourages exercising the cyberattack option as the enemy may not have access to cyber capability. Uncertainty of the success of a cyber programme makes countries cautious when allocating resources not only to these programmes but also in conventional armament.

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