“…, and the consumer buys the low-end product when − ≥ − and − ≥ 0; explicitly, ∈ ( / , 1 ). Similar to Yu [26], we can depict Figure 1. Define 2 = / (> 0).…”
Section: The Basic Model (Wholesale Price First (Wpf) Scenario)mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…These models mainly assume that there are two exogenous market segments. Market segmentation can be influenced by some market tools, such as product positioning [25] and operationrelated costs [26]. We investigate when a common component should be used in a supply chain, where there are two market segments.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We normalize market size to one. Following Chayet et al [25] and Yu [26], we assume that quality valuation is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. A consumer buys a product when the consumer can achieve the maximal positive utility.…”
Section: The Basic Model (Wholesale Price First (Wpf) Scenario)mentioning
We develop two game models of a one-supplier and one-manufacturer supply chain to investigate the supplier’s strategic wholesale pricing decision and the manufacturer’s commonality strategy. The manufacturer has three commonality strategies for the high-end and low-end products: common high-quality component, common low-quality component, and dedicated components. We consider both wholesale price first scenario and commonality strategy first scenario. Under the wholesale price first scenario, we identify the range of each commonality strategy and find that (i) the common low-quality component strategy is harmful to the supplier; (ii) if the quality of low-quality component and the unit production cost of high-quality component are sufficiently low, the supplier induces the common high-quality component strategy by strategically decreasing the unit wholesale price of high-quality component, while if they are sufficiently high, the supplier induces the dedicated components strategy by increasing the unit wholesale price of high-quality component and decreasing that of low-quality one. Under the commonality strategy first scenario, the common low-quality component strategy may exist. By comparing the two scenarios, we find that (i) if the unit production cost of low-quality component is medium, the equilibrium outcomes under both scenarios are identical; (ii) there exists a first-mover advantage for the two players.
“…, and the consumer buys the low-end product when − ≥ − and − ≥ 0; explicitly, ∈ ( / , 1 ). Similar to Yu [26], we can depict Figure 1. Define 2 = / (> 0).…”
Section: The Basic Model (Wholesale Price First (Wpf) Scenario)mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…These models mainly assume that there are two exogenous market segments. Market segmentation can be influenced by some market tools, such as product positioning [25] and operationrelated costs [26]. We investigate when a common component should be used in a supply chain, where there are two market segments.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We normalize market size to one. Following Chayet et al [25] and Yu [26], we assume that quality valuation is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. A consumer buys a product when the consumer can achieve the maximal positive utility.…”
Section: The Basic Model (Wholesale Price First (Wpf) Scenario)mentioning
We develop two game models of a one-supplier and one-manufacturer supply chain to investigate the supplier’s strategic wholesale pricing decision and the manufacturer’s commonality strategy. The manufacturer has three commonality strategies for the high-end and low-end products: common high-quality component, common low-quality component, and dedicated components. We consider both wholesale price first scenario and commonality strategy first scenario. Under the wholesale price first scenario, we identify the range of each commonality strategy and find that (i) the common low-quality component strategy is harmful to the supplier; (ii) if the quality of low-quality component and the unit production cost of high-quality component are sufficiently low, the supplier induces the common high-quality component strategy by strategically decreasing the unit wholesale price of high-quality component, while if they are sufficiently high, the supplier induces the dedicated components strategy by increasing the unit wholesale price of high-quality component and decreasing that of low-quality one. Under the commonality strategy first scenario, the common low-quality component strategy may exist. By comparing the two scenarios, we find that (i) if the unit production cost of low-quality component is medium, the equilibrium outcomes under both scenarios are identical; (ii) there exists a first-mover advantage for the two players.
“…3. Green inventory optimization: The inventory level can be derived from the transformation functions of calculating a green economic ordering quantity (Yu 2012;Minner 2001) and a reproduction quantity with cost reduction (Luis et al 2008;Pang et al 2007). Reproduction designs are evaluated by the availability of reproduction components in the repair and recycle processes.…”
Section: Evaluation Function Of Gcd Optimizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We attempt to provide a series of reproduction strategies for adjusting the degree of component flexibility. Another challenge in the GCD optimization processes is the existing methods with the limited search ability due to large and complex search space (Tsai et al 2011;Yu 2012;Sbihi and Eglese 2010). While many studies have attempted to find better mechanisms for balancing the levels of exploration and exploitation in the evolution search space, this equilibrium is not easy to achieve.…”
This paper proposes an adaptive mechanism for improving the availability efficiency of green component design (GCD) process. The proposed approach incorporates a wide range of GCD strategies to increase availability of the recycled/reused/remanufactured components. We have also designed a self-adjusting mechanism to enhance the versatility and generality of a genetic algorithm (GA) to improve GCD availability efficiency. The mechanism allows refinement of the GA parameters for the selections of operators in each generation. Our research contribution includes the development of a novel mechanism for the evaluation of optimal selections of reproduction strategies, adjustment and optimization of the crossover and mutation rates in evolutions, and design of Taguchi Orthogonal Arrays with a GA optimizer. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithms has been examined in a GCD chain. From the experimental results, we can conclude that the proposed approach resulted in better reproduction optimization than the traditional ones.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.