Proclus’ metaphysics

Considering Divine Providence in Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636): The Problem of Evil, Theodicy, and the Divine Eros

“…In fact, given the occurrence of generation, it is impossible [for evil] too not to have arisen as a by-product, since it was necessary for the perfection of the wholes.40 Similarly in his Commentary on the Parmenides, he furthers his position on the ultimate unreality of evils by rejecting the notion of the Forms of evils .41 Proclus rejects both Gnostic approaches to the demiurge that question the goodness of providence as well as dualist metaphysics which posit evil as an independent principle (and in that he follows Plotinus).42 Unlike Plotinus, he does not think matter is the principle of evil, and unlike the Platonic tradition before him, he allows for the existence of evil albeit as a parasitical existence that depends on good things to exist and for the pursuit of the good; clearly the wider context is a providential concern for the good. 43 In On the Existence of Evils, Proclus criticises the Plotinian view that matter is evil as well as the more established Platonic notion that evil is privation (non-existence) (DMS,(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38).44 He thus rejects the popular Plotinian solution to the problem of evil that reduces it to matter which in itself is no thing.45 Much of the reason for Proclus' rejection of absolute evil and accommodation of 'accidental' evils relates to his monism.46 Evil is thus a deficiency in the true nature of something -or as Mullā Ṣadrā would put it a shortcoming in the perfection of a thing. 47 Proclus summarises his position:…”

“…125 Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī, Ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam, ed. Sayyid Ḥusayn Mūsavīyān (Tehran: SIPRIn, 1378 Š/1999), [42][43]116. 127 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Asfār, safar III, mawqif I, faṣl XII, vol. VII, 100.…”