Process safety culture in the CCPS risk based process safety model

Many facilities have now implemented and maintained process safety management (PSM) programs for 20 years or more, but these facilities continue to have sometimes serious incidents and injuries suggesting a continuing need to improve their PSM performance. Of course, new requirements are often added to upgrade PSM programs, due to near‐miss learnings, audit findings, and new recommended and generally accepted good engineering practices, for example, but often overall performance improvements have not occurred or have not achieved the desired level of performance. How can significant performance improvements be obtained? Although performance issues at different facilities will certainly vary, this article provides several key approaches for improving overall PSM performance and for helping prevent injuries and incidents. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Improving the performance of established PSM programs

Klein

Dharmavaram

2012

“…They include (a) strategies for finding ways to improve the application of PSM, (b) possible new PSM elements, and (c) essential features of a PSM management system. Frank [2] describes (a) an improved risk‐based approach that a plant should use when implementing PSM and (b) methods to create and maintain an effective safety culture relevant to PSM. Blair [3] emphasizes that PSM [4] includes the important utilization of recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The objective of this article is to express an enthusiastic support for these recommendations and to make a few additional recommendations that should enhance the utilization of those previously listed. It is believed that PSM and these referenced recommendations [1–3] are missing a few important elements that are normally known, but are being neglected by some of the larger PSM‐covered plants; and may be not known, appreciated, or practiced by the smaller plants. This article describes methods to improve the implementation of PSM (PSM documentation, communications, delegation, and follow‐up), and includes additional practices for preventing accidents (effective management system, internal audits, walk‐the‐line, and checklists).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the effectiveness of process safety management in small companies

Louvar

2008

Major accidents are continuing to injure people, and damage facilities and the environment. About 50% of these accidents are in plants that are covered by process safety management (PSM) and 50% are in smaller plants that are not covered. However, the damage is the same. Clearly the OSHA PSM regulation and recommendations by CSB, CCPS, PSP, etc. are not being used as specified. The objective of this paper is to express an enthusiastic support for these major excellent recommendations and to make a few additional recommendations that should enhance those previously listed. This article describes (a) specifically designed methods to improve the implementation of PSM and the above‐mentioned recommendations and (b) additional plant practices for preventing accidents. The methods and practices presented in this article are especially important for smaller plants; most of the larger companies already have good systems to prevent accidents. However, since many of the large accidents are in PSM‐covered plants, some of these larger plants may also benefit from these additional recommendations. One recommendation is that small companies, although not covered by PSM, should practice the intent of the regulation. At a minimum, companies should develop a document that is at least similar to the PSM documentation. However, this article emphasizes that this documentation is not enough because the management of the requirements is extremely difficult. Companies need to have a system that includes the PSM documents, communication, delegation, and follow‐up to insure that the requirements are practiced as intended. Based on the author's experience, the use of additional plant practices such as an effective management system, internal audits, walk‐the‐line, and checklists will enhance the utilization of PSM. These practices are easy to use and will prevent accidents. More of these methods and practices are needed and should be shared between companies. © 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2008

Development of a process safety culture of chemical engineers

Mckay

Lacoursière

2008

Chemical engineers are frequently responsible for designing and operating process facilities. These facilities could cause major accidents with consequences on site and off site. Equilibrium has to be maintained between production pressure and safety requirements. This equilibrium can only be achieved if the people involved with the process plant develop and maintain a strong process safety culture. Lessons from the Challenger, Columbia, BP Texas City accidents, etc. indicate that there are five important key organization culture themes that need to be taken into account: Maintain sense of vulnerability Establish an imperative for safety Perform valid/timely hazard/risk assessments Ensure open and frank communications Learn and advance the culture This paper will describe how a chemical engineer can integrate these as a safety roadmap. © 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2008