2018
DOI: 10.1109/tifs.2018.2833063
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Process-Aware Covert Channels Using Physical Instrumentation in Cyber-Physical Systems

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Cited by 28 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…For instance, in filesystem steganography, the cover object might be a file, unused space in a partially allocated block, cluster distribution of an existing file [14], or an inode [7]. In cyber-physical systems (CPS) steganography, a value might be embedded into a sensor value [32], an actuator state or unused registers [34], or into the control logic of a PLC [15]. Hidden data might even be embedded into the number of cyber-physical events of some machine.…”
Section: Analysis Of Existing Steganography Domainsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, in filesystem steganography, the cover object might be a file, unused space in a partially allocated block, cluster distribution of an existing file [14], or an inode [7]. In cyber-physical systems (CPS) steganography, a value might be embedded into a sensor value [32], an actuator state or unused registers [34], or into the control logic of a PLC [15]. Hidden data might even be embedded into the number of cyber-physical events of some machine.…”
Section: Analysis Of Existing Steganography Domainsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Krishnamurthy et al [171] described the possibility for malware to rely on acoustic emissions of actuators, e.g., that of a motor controlling a valve as part of a closed-loop process, towards creating a covert channel that can ultimately retrieve a 128-bit key in little over four minutes. Tychalas and Maniatakos [172], examined the applicability of cache timing side-channel attacks, including Spectre and Evictand-Reload.…”
Section: F Side Channel Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Krishnamurthy et al [77] proposed a new method to use the analog emissions of physical instrumentation (e.g., actuators and sensors) to leak sensitive or process-specific information through side channels, such as power, electromagnetic, thermal, and acoustic channels. They also considered the controller's dynamics and its closed-loop characteristics to avoid triggering the CPS alarm system.…”
Section: Covert Channelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the perception layer, attackers try to steal information or send malicious commands through various covert channels. An adversary could remotely receive data by changing the lightness of smart lights [32], monitoring covert acoustic channels [77,78], and utilizing hidden voice methods to inject malicious commands [33,34]. Researchers have also tried to mitigate information leakage problems by optimizing the design variables and machine process [97].…”
Section: Attackmentioning
confidence: 99%