Procedure, Participation, Rights

Bone, Robert G.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1600246

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…In other words, we enjoy genuine procedural rights. Within the class of rights‐based theories, it is necessary to distinguish between outcome‐based theories and process‐based theories (Bone, , pp. 1015, 1027).…”

Section: Utilitarianism Versus Procedural Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The question is how this acknowledgement can be reconciled with respect for procedural rights, which by definition are strongly resistant to utilitarian arguments, as explained previously. This is a question faced by all theories that recognise procedural rights, since Dworkin is clearly right that it would be fanatical to prioritise accuracy over all other social needs (Bone, , p. 1017).…”

Section: Outcome‐based Theories Of Procedural Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It will be clear that Dworkin turns procedural justice into a form of distributive justice: procedural rights are not rights to a specific level of accuracy in adjudication but rights that guarantee that the risk of error created by inaccurate procedures is fairly distributed (Bone, , pp. 1018, 1020).…”

Section: Outcome‐based Theories Of Procedural Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Procedural justice and the law

Meyerson

Mackenzie

2018

Philosophy Compass

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This article considers procedural justice in the law, with specific reference to the adjudicative context of governmental officials applying legal standards to particular cases. We critically survey the three main accounts of procedural justice in the literature: utilitarian, outcome-based, and dignitarian. Utilitarian and outcome-based theories share the instrumental view that the only purpose of procedures is to lead to accurate legal outcomes. However, the former are willing to trade off the benefits of accuracy against its costs, whereas the latter hold that procedural rights are necessary to guard against the injustice caused when individuals' legal rights are mistakenly denied.Dignitarian theories maintain that process matters apart from outcomes, because procedures should show respect for individuals' dignity in the Kantian sense of rational agency. We present a new perspective, drawing on relational theory. Relational theory holds that we are social creatures whose self-identities and sense of self-respect are bound up with the quality of our relationships with other individuals, groups, and institutions. Our relational account is informed by empirical research in social psychology which has found that people's evaluation of procedures is substantially influenced by relational concerns.

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Section: Utilitarianism Versus Procedural Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Outcome‐based Theories Of Procedural Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Procedural justice and the law

Meyerson

Mackenzie

2018

Philosophy Compass

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“…Sin embargo, no fue en la legislación propiamente procedimental en la que se recogió expresamente la inexcusabilidad, pues ella se verifi có por primera vez a través del inciso segundo del artículo 9° de la Ley de Organización y Atribuciones de los Tribunales del año 1875: "Reclamada su intervención en forma legal i en negocios de su competencia, no podrán escusarse de ejercer su autoridad ni aún por falta de lei que resuelva la contienda sometida a su decisión" 13 , en una clara referencia al artículo 4° del Código Civil francés, como lo reconoce Ballesteros 14 .…”

Section: La Positivación Del Principio De La Inexcusabilidad En Chileunclassified

“…12 Guzmán (2007) p. 45. 13 Ballesteros (1890) p. 127. 14 Ballesteros (1890) p. 130 (por error, impresa como 103): El autor luego aclara que el juez "no ejerce propiamente el poder legislativo, por que su sentencia no tiene jamás el efecto de una lei".…”

Section: Alcance Del Principio De Inexcusabilidadunclassified

El Principio De Inexcusabilidad Y El Derecho De Acción Desde La Perspectiva Del Estado Constitucional

Benavides

2012

Rev. chil. derecho

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RESUMEN: Se pretende realizar una refl exión acerca del principio constitucional de la inexcusabilidad desde un punto de vista procesal civil, en cuanto correlato orgánico y contracara del derecho de acción, en su actual comprensión como derecho fundamental a la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva. Para ello, se realizará una breve noticia de su alcance, para luego plantear una ampliación de su comprensión a la luz del paradigma del Estado Constitucional.Palabras clave: Inexcusabilidad, non liquet, derecho de acción, acceso a la justicia, derecho fundamental a la tutela efectiva de los derechos. ABSTRACT:We intend to make a refl ection on the constitutional principle of inexcusability from a civil procedural standpoint, as an organic correlate and counter face to the right to be heard in its current understanding as fundamental right to the effective judicial protection. For this, we will make a brief account of its scope, and then we will propose an extension of its meaning in the light of the constitutional state paradigm. Key words:Non liquet, rule of action, right to be heard, fundamental right to effective jurisdictional guardianship. INTRODUCCIÓNEl presente trabajo tiene por fi n proponer una reformulación del principio de inexcusabilidad, a la luz de las exigencias del paradigma del Estado Constitucional.Tradicionalmente, como se pretenderá demostrar a lo largo de estas líneas, el principio de inexcusabilidad ha sido comprendido con un alcance limitado al mero deber de fallar que le corresponde al órgano judicial, y este a su vez, restringido a la comprensión de la prohibición del non liquet, en cuanto regla que alcanza relevancia frente a la situación -improbable-de ausencia concreta de ley decisoria litis, por lo que se ha considerado tal * Trabajo realizado dentro del proyecto regular Fondecyt N° 1111021-2011, "Principios de la tutela ejecutiva del crédito", siendo su investigador principal, el Dr. Álvaro Pérez-Ragone.

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The Legitimacy of U.S. Government Agency Power

Feldman

2014

Public Administration Review

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A synthesis of the work of two political and legal scholars, John Rohr and Lon Fuller, properly balances constitutional and managerial values, supplementing other theories that offer useful but insufficient support for American government agency legitimacy. Agencies reflecting that balance would strengthen their legitimacy—a particularly valuable goal in an era of low confidence in American government. Rohr's focus on the constitutional oath of office and American regime values, and Fuller's insistence that law must serve human needs, leave a great deal indeterminate and discretionary but nevertheless set boundaries. Bureaucrats who risked or sacrificed their jobs to avoid transgressing those boundaries offer models of loyalty to the Rohr‐Fuller balance of values. The behavior of officials in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in thwarting measures that could have averted the financial crisis of 2007 offers a model of bureaucrats who violated those boundaries.

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Procedure, Participation, Rights

Cited by 6 publications

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Procedural justice and the law

Procedural justice and the law

El Principio De Inexcusabilidad Y El Derecho De Acción Desde La Perspectiva Del Estado Constitucional

The Legitimacy of U.S. Government Agency Power

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