Probleme des ‚kantianischen‘ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion

Abstract

Abstract:Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded (e.g. with reference to KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. (§ 13), which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis.

The Unity of Cognition and the Subjectivist vs. “Transformative” Approaches to the B-Deduction, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79)

“…I have argued elsewhere (Schulting 2015;2017a, ch. 5) that most Kantian nonconceptualists however believe…”

“…Reason (2) points to regress problems, which I have frequently indicated in my own papers dealing with nonconceptualism (Schulting 2010;2015;2017a, ch. 5).…”

The Unity of Cognition, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79)

“…In fact, L-experience and K-experience are not to be seen as two different kinds of experience. Rather, L-experience is the sensory state or states which we would be in, I have argued elsewhere (Schulting 2010;2015;2017, Chap. 5) that most Kantian nonconceptualists however 80 believe that the reference to an object in an intuition, independently of the categories, is already in some way objectively valid, and I have argued that this reading is mistaken-for Kant, objective validity is a function solely of the categories and judgement.…”

“…Conant also mentions Beck's reference to the oft-discussed passage at A90-91/B122-123, where Kant considers the apparently hypothetical case that our appearances do not conform to the functions of thought or the categories. It is a pity that Conant does not quote the recent literature on the interpretation of this passage (see Ginsborg 2008, Allison 2012, Gomes 2014, Golob 2016, Schulting 2015. Conant says that there are two logically possible options, but that only one is really possible.…”

“…Reason (2) points to regress problems, which I have frequently indicated in my own papers dealing with nonconceptualism (Schulting 2010;2015;2017, Chap. 5).…”