Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Semantics for a Protocol Security Logic

Datta, Anupam; Derek, Ante; Mitchell, John C.; Shmatikov, Vitaly; Turuani, Mathieu

doi:10.1007/11523468_2

Cited by 72 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The axioms presented in this paper are used in Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [24,26,41,25,39]. Our formalization uses the characterization of "good key" from [27], but improves on previous work in several respects: (i) we fix a bug in the DH axiom in [27] by using the "DHStrongSecretive" formulas developed in the paper, (ii) we present a general inductive method for proving secrecy conditions for Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and (iii) we present axioms for reasoning from ciphertext integrity assumptions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More generally, Abadi and Rogaway [1] initiated computationally sound symbolic analysis of static equivalence, with extensions and completeness explored in [37,2]; a recent extension to Diffie-Hellman appears in [15], covering only passive adversaries, not the stronger active adversaries used in the present paper. Protocol Composition Logic [24] was used in a case study of 802.11i [29], has previous computational semantics [26], and was used to study protocol composition and key exchange [27]. In other studies of DHKE, [30] uses a symbolic model, while [36] imposes nonstandard protocol assumptions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additional background appears in [24,26,41,25,39]. Modelling protocols A protocol is given by a set of roles, each specifying a sequence of actions to be executed by an honest agent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since an attacker is not given by a symbolic program, a trace only records the send-receive actions of the attacker, not its internal actions. Traces also include the random bits (used by the honest parties, the adversary and available to an additional probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm called the distinguisher), as well as a few other elements used in defining semantics of formulas over collections of traces [26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We say a protocol Q satisfies a formula ϕ, written Q |= ϕ if, for all adversaries and sufficiently large security parameters, the probability that ϕ "holds" is asymptotically overwhelming. A precise inductive semantics is given in [26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Datta

Mitchell

Trustworthy Global Computing

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Abstract. We present axioms and inference rules for reasoning about Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange protocols and use these rules to prove authentication and secrecy properties of two important protocol standards, the Diffie-Hellman variant of Kerberos, and IKEv2, the revised standard key management protocol for IPSEC. The new proof system is sound for an accepted semantics used in cryptographic studies. In the process of applying our system, we uncover a deficiency in Diffie-Hellman Kerberos that is easily repaired.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additional background appears in [24,26,41,25,39]. Modelling protocols A protocol is given by a set of roles, each specifying a sequence of actions to be executed by an honest agent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Datta

Mitchell

Trustworthy Global Computing

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Protocol Derivation System for the Needham–Schroeder family

Zhang

Yang

2012

Security Comm Networks

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A framework consisting of the Protocol Derivation System (PDS) and the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) has been recently proposed by Datta et al. for the design and analysis of a secure composition of cryptographic protocols. However, the PDS in this proposed framework can only be used for the protocols of the Station-to-Station family, which are signature-based authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols. In this paper, the PDS is extended to support key exchange protocols using a trusted third party and an encryption-based authentication such as those in the Needham-Schroeder family. This is achieved by means of adding new components, refinements, and transformations to the PDS. In addition, the PCL is applied to prove the correctness of the derived protocols. Then, the derivation graph of the NeedhamÀSchroeder family is developed by using the extended PDS. Finally, the derivations and proofs of the protocols in the Needham-Schroeder family are shown in this paper.

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Computationally Sound Implementations of Equational Theories Against Passive Adversaries

Baudet

Cortier

Kremer

2005

Automata, Languages and Programming

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In this paper we study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security protocols in the presence of passive adversaries. In contrast to other works, we do not consider a fixed set of primitives but aim at results for arbitrary equational theories. We define a framework for comparing a cryptographic implementation and its idealization with respect to various security notions. In particular, we concentrate on the computational soundness of static equivalence, a standard tool in cryptographic pi calculi. We present a soundness criterion, which for many theories is not only sufficient but also necessary. Finally, to illustrate our framework, we establish the soundness of static equivalence for the exclusive OR and a theory of ciphers and lists.

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Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Semantics for a Protocol Security Logic

Cited by 72 publications

References 14 publications

Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Formal Proofs of Cryptographic Security of Diffie-Hellman-Based Protocols

Protocol Derivation System for the Needham–Schroeder family

Computationally Sound Implementations of Equational Theories Against Passive Adversaries

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