Probabilistic coherence measures: a psychological study of coherence assessment

Koscholke, Jakob

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0996-6

Cited by 6 publications

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“…2 A. Meinong Uber Moglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (1915), p. 465. 3 Neurath (1932) 4 See Slaughter and Gopnik (1996); Thagard (2000); Roche (2013); Koscholke and Jekel (2016) 5 For an overview see Olsson (2017) 6 While there has been recent work on coherence that shows that under different conditions coherence justification is possible (See Huemer (2011)), there is a more natural move to make in response to the earlier results.…”

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confidence: 99%

Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems

Poston

2021

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

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It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by Huemer, M. 1997. “Probability and Coherence Justification.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 463–72, Olsson, E. 2002. “What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?” Journal of Philosophy XCIX (5): 246–72, Olsson, E. 2005. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford University Press., Bovens, L., and S. Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford University Press, prove that, under certain conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These formal results, known as ‘the impossibility theorems’ have been widely discussed in the literature. They are taken to have significant epistemic upshot. In particular, they are taken to show that reports must first individually confirm the target claim before the coherence of multiple reports offers any positive confirmation. In this paper, I dispute this epistemic interpretation. The impossibility theorems are consistent with the idea that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true even if the reports do not individually confirm prior to coherence. Once we see that the formal discoveries do not have this implication, we can recover a model of coherence justification consistent with Bayesianism and these results. This paper, thus, seeks to turn the tide of the negative findings for coherence reasoning by defending coherence as a unique source of confirmation.

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Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems

Poston

2021

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

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Measuring Need-Based Justice: Empirically and Formally

Bauer,

Siebel

2024

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Coherentism

Olsson

2022

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Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the world ultimately rests. The traditional Cartesian answer is that it rests on indubitable facts arrived at through rational insight or introspection. Coherentists reject this answer, claiming instead that knowledge arises from relations of coherence or mutual support: if our beliefs cohere, we can be sure that they are mostly true. The first part of this Element introduces the reader to the main ideas and problems of coherentism. The next part describes the 'probabilistic turn', leading up to recent demonstrations that coherence fails to be conducive to truth. The final part reassesses the current debate about the proper definition of coherence from the standpoint of Rudolf Carnap's methodology of explication. The upshot is a tentative and qualified defence of one of the early coherence measures.

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Probabilistic coherence measures: a psychological study of coherence assessment

Cited by 6 publications

References 35 publications

Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems

Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems

Measuring Need-Based Justice: Empirically and Formally

Coherentism

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