Probabilistic Anonymity

Bhargava, Mohit; Palamidessi, Catuscia

doi:10.1007/11539452_16

Cited by 79 publications

(138 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(14 reference statements)

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“…Various notions of probabilistic anonymity have been proposed in literature, at different levels of strength. The notion of anonymity in [3], called conditional anonymity in [9,10], and investigated also in [2], describes the ideal situation in which the protocol does not leak any information concerning the identity of the user. This property is satisfied for instance by the Dining Cryptographers with fair coins [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probable Innocence Revisited

Chatzikokolakis

Palamidessi

2006

Formal Aspects in Security and Trust

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In this paper we propose a formalization of probable innocence, a notion of probabilistic anonymity that is associated to "realistic" protocols such as Crowds. We analyze critically two different definitions of probable innocence from the literature. The first one, corresponding to the property that Reiter and Rubin have proved for Crowds, aims at limiting the probability of detection. The second one, by Halpern and O'Neill, aims at constraining the attacker's confidence. Our proposal combines the spirit of both these definitions while generalizing them. In particular, our definition does not need symmetry assumptions, and it does not depend on the probabilities of the users to perform the action of interest. We show that, in case of a symmetric system, our definition corresponds exactly to the one of Reiter and Rubin. Furthermore, in the case of users with uniform probabilities, it amounts to a property similar to that of Halpern and O'Neill.Another contribution of our paper is the study of probable innocence in the case of protocol composition, namely when multiple runs of the same protocol can be linked, as in the case of Crowds.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probable Innocence Revisited

Chatzikokolakis

Palamidessi

2006

Formal Aspects in Security and Trust

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“…For the later case study, the Prism probabilistic model checker has been used. Anonymity for π-calculi has been proposed in [8], in combination with information hiding in [39]. In the present paper, following [33], anonymity is implied by a behavioral property, viz.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 93%

Architecting Security with Paradigm

Andova

Groenewegen

Verschuren

et al. 2009

Architecting Dependable Systems VI

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Abstract. For large security systems a clear separation of concerns is achieved through architecting. Particularly the dynamic consistency between the architectural components should be addressed, in addition to individual component behaviour. In this paper, relevant dynamic consistency is specified through Paradigm, a coordination modeling language based on dynamic constraints. As it is argued, this fits well with security issues. A smaller example introduces the architectural approach towards implementing security policies. A larger casestudy illustrates the use of Paradigm in analyzing the FOO voting scheme. In addition, translating the Paradigm models into process algebra brings model checking within reach. Security properties of the examples discussed, are formally verified with the model checker mCRL2.

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“…Probabilistic privacy has been investigated in [3] (where it is called probabilistic anonymity). The notion of coercion-resistance is defined in [6].…”

Section: Conclusion On Vote Influencingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymity in Voting Revisited

Jonker

Pieters

2010

Towards Trustworthy Elections

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Abstract. According to international law, anonymity of the voter is a fundamental precondition for democratic elections. In electronic voting, several aspects of voter anonymity have been identified. In this paper, we re-examine anonymity with respect to voting, and generalise existing notions of anonymity in e-voting. First, we identify and categorise the types of attack that can be a threat to anonymity of the voter, including different types of vote buying and coercion. This analysis leads to a categorisation of anonymity in voting in terms of a) the strength of the anonymity achieved and b) the extent of interaction between voter and attacker. Some of the combinations, including weak and strong receiptfreeness, are formalised in epistemic logic.

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Probabilistic Anonymity

Cited by 79 publications

References 27 publications

Probable Innocence Revisited

Probable Innocence Revisited

Architecting Security with Paradigm

Anonymity in Voting Revisited

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