Privatized urbanity or a politicized society? Reconstruction in Beirut after the civil war

Abstract

After 16 years of civil war in Lebanon, with massive destruction and, in the end, a fragmented society, the reconstruction of Beirut has been very difficult, with the marginalized state stepping back early on in favour of a private reconstruction under the leadership of the businessman and later Prime Minister Hariri. For the successful implementation of the reconstruction Hariri established a private real estate company that not only expropriated the former tenants and owners, but also evacuated the refugees who had occupied properties in the deserted city centre. The reconstruction of Beirut is characterized by the exclusion of most of the protagonists involved. Tenants, owners, and refugees, but also the former elites from politics, science and society were replaced by a group of newcomers, war-profiteers and investors. The decision-making therefore was strongly profit-orientated and often took place behind closed doors. In Beirut a radical new concept of urban development and urban governance has been implemented that led to a "privatization of the urban". Due to the profit orientation and the exclusion of the protagonists involved, the reconstruction of Beirut's downtown triggered a highly controversial public debate and resulted in a substantial "political mobilization" of Lebanese society. For the first time after the civil war, Lebanese society dared to speak up and publicly comment on the reconstruction. The political mobilization of the society was accompanied by a subsequent "medialization" of the conflict: The struggle over the reconstruction was negotiated to a large part through the media where initiators and critics tried to promote their strategic visions for the reconstruction. Regarding a New Urban Governance, post-war urban development in Beirut was realized mainly within a framework of democratic society. Nevertheless the process of reconstruction is characterized by an exclusion of most of the protagonists involved and by a strong market orientation which often disregarded public interests.

Neoliberal Urbanity and the Right to the City: A View from Beirut's Periphery

“…Many of the approaches adopted in the post‐civil war reconstruction in Lebanon can be ascribed to a neoliberal tendency in the conception of the role and position of the state (Nagel, 2000; Schmid, 2006). Indeed, the first fifteen years following the end of sectarian military conflicts (1990–2005) were emblematic of a market‐led development approach in which many of the principles generally associated with neoliberal policy making, such as the liberalization of social services, the allocation of public subsidies to the market, and others (Harvey, 2007) were widely adopted.…”

The dynamics of effective corrupt leadership: Lessons from Rafik Hariri's political career in Lebanon

“…In essence, it was an unavoidable and required part of doing the dirty work of being prime minister (Johnson, 1986). Rafik Hariri certainly fits this characterization (Becherer, 2005;Nizameddin, 2006;Schmid, 2006). The following section examines his options and actions as he led Lebanon's reconstruction.…”

“…"Effective corrupt" politicians are embodiments of this. For Hariri to have made any progress in the reconstruction of Beirut required "dirty hands", which in the end undermined his credibility and political capital (Nizameddin, 2006;Schmid, 2006). Examining an embedded issue such as the Blifil Paradox thus holds lessons about the realities of leading in corrupt countries, and shows how difficult it is to evaluate the ethics of those operating in such circumstances.…”

Remembering Beirut: Lessons for Archaeology and (Post-) Conflict Urban Redevelopment in Aleppo

“…The redevelopment of central Beirut (BCD) demonstrates a lot of these problems. Planned as a neoliberal regeneration project, the result is an upmarket tourist, shopping and business 'destination' that has, it is argued, excluded most of its original inhabitants and has lost much of its cultural identity (Cooke 2002;Schmid 2006;Ragab 2011;Ilyés 2015). The Ta'if Accord that stopped the war put in place a policy of amnesty and amnesia because politically there was a strong desire to move on from it.…”