Privatization <i>Within</i> the Chinese State

Kuo, Cheng-Tian

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.1994.tb00189.x

Cited by 21 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 18 publications

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“…"Privatization" has often been used as a vehicle to accelerate decentralization in China. China decentralizes property ownership to local governments, state enterprises and individuals, which eventually leads to a change in power relations among central government, local governments and the private sector (Kuo 1994). China privatizes not only physical assets but social programs such as health care, urban housing, and education through pure privatization, contracting-out and cofinancing modes (You 1994).…”

Section: Decentralization and Privatizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shaping Administrative Reform and Governance: An Examination of the Political Nexus Triads in Three Asian Countries

Moon

Ingraham

1998

Governance

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When addressing administrative reform, many scholars have referred to the fact that governments confront multiple internal challenges such as fiscal stress, distrust of bureaucracy, and higher demands for public services (Peters and Savoie 1995). Externally, governments become more sensitive to global issues and tend to be more influenced by international environments (Garcia‐Zamor and Khator 1994). Faced with internal and external challenges, governments seek new paradigms for governance (Ingraham and Romzek 1994) and often initiate administrative reform (AR) aimed at enhancing governmental performance and improving the administrative system through technological advances, managerial improvements, administrative innovations and continued enhancement of administrative capabilities (Caiden 1991). Administrative reform and its diffusion among Western countries are well documented in the literature (Campbell and Peters 1988; Savoie 1994; Halligan 1996; Peters and Savoie 1995). However, studies are skewed toward Western countries and little attention has been paid to Asia. Even less attention has been paid to comparative studies on Asian administrative reform, even though many Asian countries have developed their own AR trajectories to improve public efficiency and productivity (Burns 1994; Zhang, De Guzman, and Reforma 1992). As many students of comparative public administration (CPA) understand, it is always a challenging task, both methodologically and theoretically, to examine a group of different countries (Aberbach and Rockman 1987; Heady 1996a; 1996b; Peters 1988; Peters 1996). It is an even more challenging and controversial task to develop a single comparative framework from which we can examine different countries. This article attempts to fill a gap in the literature by examining Asian AR from a comparative perspective. First, we propose an exploratory theoretical framework, a Political Nexus Triad (PNT). PNT is an extended model, which adds civil society as the third dimension to the traditional politics‐administration model. We suggest the PNT and its dynamic trajectory as a building block of the comparative study of Asian administrative reform. This is similar to the power interaction models in which Peters (1988) addresses the power interactions between politicians and bureaucrats.1 Second, we examine the conventional patterns of PNT for three Asian countries: China, Japan, and Korea. Third, we survey AR of the three countries, focusing on actors, contents and potential impacts to the new PNT. Finally, we discuss conclusions and comparisons

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Section: Decentralization and Privatizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shaping Administrative Reform and Governance: An Examination of the Political Nexus Triads in Three Asian Countries

Moon

Ingraham

1998

Governance

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Disembedding Autonomy

Carroll¹,

Jarvis

Asia After the Developmental State

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China's Long March toward Rule of Law

Peerenboom

2002

509

191

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China has enjoyed considerable economic growth in recent years in spite of an immature, albeit rapidly developing, legal system, a system whose nature, evolution and path of development have been poorly understood by scholars. Drawing on his legal and business experience in China as well as his academic background in the field, Peerenboom provides a detailed analysis of China's legal reforms. He argues that China is in transition from rule by law to a version of rule of law, though most likely not a liberal democratic version as found in economically advanced countries in the West. Maintaining that law plays a key role in China's economic growth, Peerenboom assesses reform proposals and makes his own recommendations. In addition to students and scholars of Chinese law, political science, sociology and economics, this will interest business professionals, policy advisors, and governmental and non-governmental agencies as well as comparative legal scholars and philosophers.

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Privatization Within the Chinese State

Cited by 21 publications

References 18 publications

Shaping Administrative Reform and Governance: An Examination of the Political Nexus Triads in Three Asian Countries

Shaping Administrative Reform and Governance: An Examination of the Political Nexus Triads in Three Asian Countries

Disembedding Autonomy

China's Long March toward Rule of Law

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