Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls

Ripstein, Arthur

doi:10.4324/9781315089188-12

Cited by 10 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…There is a contrast between the responsibility of citizens qua individuals for their particular pursuits and the responsibility of citizens considered together in a state for guaranteeing basic liberties and the opportunities to make these pursuits possible. 38 These responsibilities correspond generally to the spheres of private and public law. 39 Ripstein claims that Rawls's idea of responsibility of citizens qua individuals helps provide us with 'a distinctive way of thinking about human freedom and independence' relevant to our understanding of private law.…”

Section: Rawlsian Private Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…39 Ripstein claims that Rawls's idea of responsibility of citizens qua individuals helps provide us with 'a distinctive way of thinking about human freedom and independence' relevant to our understanding of private law. 40 This distinction of two types of responsibilities highlights the dual identities each citizen possesses that a theory about political justice should capture. Citizens stand in two different relations to each another linked to a distinctive responsibility.…”

Section: Rawlsian Private Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Capabilities, Political Liberalism and Private Law

Brooks¹

2018

arsp

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This article argues political liberalism can and should be revised to improve its relevance to the private law. This approach is not a rejection of political liberalism, but instead a restatement consistent with the fundamental tenets of Rawls's theory of justice. The first part begins with a brief summary of Rawls's political liberalism. The second part discusses the strategies used to demonstrate the relevance of Rawls's theory to the private law. The third part examines how Rawls's theory can and should be revised by incorporating capabilities. I argue this revision can be undertaken in a way that best develops the relevance of political liberalism.

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Section: Rawlsian Private Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Rawlsian Private Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capabilities, Political Liberalism and Private Law

Brooks¹

2018

arsp

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“…This has led to different interpretations of the basic structure. Generally speaking, it has been interpreted either narrowly or broadly (Ripstein ; Kordana and Tabachnick , 598–601). Interpreted narrowly the basic structure only includes a number of constitutional essentials and some welfare programs.…”

Section: The Basic Structure and Its Role In Justice As Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rawls himself is at best ambiguous about this. As a result, the basic structure has been interpreted narrowly (Ripstein ), in which case contract law is excluded, or interpreted broadly (Kordana and Tabachnick ), in which case contract law is included. In this article I will discuss both interpretations and eventually argue that contract law does form a part of the basic structure of society.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Law as Fairness

Klijnsma

2015

Ratio Juris

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This article examines the implications for contract law of Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. It argues that contract law as an institution is part of the basic structure of society and as such subject to the principles of justice. Discussing the basic structure in relation to contract law is particularly interesting because it is instructive for both contract law and Rawlsian theory. On the one hand, justice as fairness has clear normative implications for the institution of contract law. On the other hand, this discussion forces us to critically assess the meaning and appeal of the concept of a basic structure in justice as fairness.

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“…Locke famously said that one could acquire ownership of natural resources so long as one left 'enough, and as good' for others (1689: II.V.27). Rather than a holistic principle that tells us which particular 6 This is not totally without irony, however, since Ripstein's own Kantian account of natural rights is such that they are radically indeterminate until enshrined in the positive law of a statea state that has very wide discretion in ordering a property system away from its 'natural' structure toward a structure demanded by distributive justice (Ripstein 2006(Ripstein , 2009, also see Stilz (2009: 40) and Hasan (2018); against this interpretation of Kant, see Téson and van der Vossen (2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

Ambidextrous Lockeanism

Christmas

2019

Economics and Philosophy

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Lockean approaches to property take it that persons can unilaterally acquire private ownership over hitherto unowned resources. Such natural law accounts of property rights are often thought to be of limited use when dealing with the complexities of natural resource use outside of the paradigm of private ownership of land for agricultural or residential development. The tragedy of the commons has been shown to be anything but an inevitability, and yet Lockeanism seems to demand that even the most robust common property arrangements be converted to privatized units. This often motivates a move away from natural law in the moral analysis of property rights. I argue however that it is not the deontological nature of Lockean principles that are at fault, but rather the manner of their application. Lockean theory often exhibits a bias in favour of private property: assuming that only private property can protect one’s interest in autonomy, and therefore asserting that each individual has a power of private acquisition. Starting with a claim against interference however enables us to mould the appropriate property rights to each individual’s particular interest in autonomy. This sometimes leads to private ownership, but often leads to various forms of commons.

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Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Capabilities, Political Liberalism and Private Law

Capabilities, Political Liberalism and Private Law

Contract Law as Fairness

Ambidextrous Lockeanism

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