Private Conscience &amp; Public Order: Hobbes &amp; "The Federalist"

McDowell, Gary L.

doi:10.2307/3234972

Cited by 6 publications

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“…48 Locke 1988. For a discussion of the more limited ends and disputes of the constitutional polity defended in The Federalist, see McDowell 1993. 50 Howe 1979 points to a Whig tradition within which an executive could defer to the legislature in matters of legislation while remaining strong in matters of war and security.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…72 Roosevelt (1906) writes: "There certainly never was a more extraordinary despotism than this; the despotism of a man who sought power, not to gratify himself, or those belonging to him, in any of the methods to which all other tyrants have been prone; but to establish the reign of the Lord, as he saw it" (p. 213). For a discussion of the more limited ends and disputes of the constitutional polity defended in The Federalist, see McDowell 1993. 73 Franklin 1787.…”

Section: Analysis Agrees With Bothmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Lincoln's Example: Executive Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism

Kleinerman¹

2005

PPS

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In the wake of the Bush administration's use of executive power since 9/11, Abraham Lincoln's executive actions during the Civil War have received more attention than usual. Typically associated with the idea that constitutions should recede in favor of the rule of one during crisis situations, Lincoln's actions have been used on one side as the implicit and even explicit basis of presidential claims to increased power and on the other side as the example par excellence of what presidents should not do. Taking issue with this conventional interpretation and continuing the more recent scholarly recovery of Lincoln's profound concern for constitutionalism, I explicate the principles that guided Lincoln's use of executive power during the Civil War. By drawing out the importance of political necessity as the basis for "prerogative" over and against both popular approval and unlimited constitutional powers, I show how this principle also provides an alternative perspective and even an antidote to the current scholarly debate concerning whether constitutions are better preserved by "Jeffersonian" or "Hamiltonian" prerogative. Lincoln's example also shows us that we should not legalize, regularize, or institutionalize those powers that may be necessary to avert a crisis. Perhaps most importantly, Lincoln's statesmanship teaches us that constitutions can moderate and limit discretionary executive power only if the people learn an attachment to their Constitution that does not come naturally to them.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Analysis Agrees With Bothmentioning

confidence: 99%