Private and Common Property Rights

Остром, Элинор; Hess, Charlotte

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1304699

Cited by 77 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 503 publications

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“…It is important to di¡erentiate between a type of resource (common pool resource) described in terms of physical characteristics, and a type of property right (common property) described in terms of access and harvest rules (Ostrom 2000a). Common property is a type of property right in which a group of owners of a resource has a speci¢ed bundle of access and use rights.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy analysis for tropical marine reserves: challenges and directions

et al. 2003

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Marine reserves are considered to be a central tool for marine ecosystem-based management in tropical inshore fisheries. The arguments supporting marine reserves are often based on both the nonmarket values of ecological amenities marine reserves provide and the pragmatic cost saving advantages relating to reserve monitoring and enforcement. Marine reserves are, however, only one of a suite of possible policy options that might be used to achieve conservation and fisheries management objectives and have rarely been the focus of rigorous policy analyses that consider a full range of economic costs and benefits, including the transaction costs of management. If credible analyses are not undertaken, there is a danger that current enthusiasm for marine reserves may wane as economic performance fails to meet presumed potential. Fully accounting for the value of ecological services flowing from marine reserves requires consideration of increased size and abundance of focal species within reserve boundaries, emigration of target species from reserves to adjacent fishing grounds, changes in ecological resilience, and behavioral responses of fishers to spatially explicit closures. Expanding policy assessments beyond standard cost-benefit analysis also requires considering the impact of social capital on the costs of managing fisheries. In the short term, the amount of social capital that communities possess and the capacity of the State to support the rights of individuals and communities will affect the relative efficiency of marine reserves.Reserves may be the most efficient policy option when both Community and State capacity is high, but may not be when one and/or the other is weak. In the longer term, the level of social capital that a society possesses and the level of uncertainty in ecological and social systems will also impact the appropriate level of devolution or decentralization of fisheries governance. Determining the proper balance of the 'State' and the 'Community' in tropical fisheries governance will require broad comparative studies of marine reserves and alternative policy tools.3

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Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy analysis for tropical marine reserves: challenges and directions

et al. 2003

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“…In this instance, each characteristic is considered relevant to natural resources and comprises access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation rights. Ostrom (2000) also observes that ''[t]he rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation can be separately assigned to different individuals as well as being viewed as a cumulative scale moving from minimal rights of access through possession of full property rights.'' complex by the multiple dimensions of water over which a set of rights might then need to be mapped.…”

Section: Dimensions Of Watermentioning

confidence: 99%

Coase-coloured Glasses and Rights Bundling: Why the Initial Specification of Water Rights in Volumetric Terms Matters

Crase

Gawne

2011

Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy

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One of the substantive accomplishes of water reform in Australia has been the creation of water markets to assist in the allocation and reallocation of the resource. As the necessity for effectively managing water to achieve environmental objectives becomes more overt, the structure of water rights requires attention. In this article, we argue that the heavy focus on the volumetric attributes of water disguises other important elements of water that are likely to be especially significant for environmental managers and other interests like tourism and recreation.

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“…classificatory system, supplementing it where it proves helpful with the work of Elinor Ostrom (2000). Drahos' (2006) four common property regimes are based around two key distinctions: that between the positive and the negative, and between inclusiveness and exclusiveness.…”

Section: Pgr As Global Commonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The solution, according to Hardin, lies in the allocation of rights as private or public (state) property (Hardin, 1968). A growing volume of ground-based evidence and scholarly work has, however, shown that users of commons have devised institutional arrangements and governance regimes that are sustainable for long time periods, allocate resources equitably and minimize efficiency losses (Agrawal, 2001;Dietz et al, 2003;Ostrom, 2000). PGR as a global commons is, therefore, not necessarily an unachievable utopia.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Shifting Common Spaces of Plant Genetic Resources in the International Regulation of Property

Roa-Rodríguez

Dooren

2008

World Intellectual Property

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The appellative “common heritage of mankind” is often used as a description of the property domain that governed plant genetic resources (PGR) at an international level up until the end of the twentieth century. However, the concept is rarely elaborated on. In this article we explore the origins of common property in PGR and the shifting content and shape of the genetic commons over the past several decades. Using the theoretical framework of diverse common property regimes developed by Peter Drahos, we chart the way in which the emergence and interaction of various international regulatory regimes related to PGR reshape common property spaces, rights and obligations. We argue that these international agreements do not regulate a single property domain in isolation, but rather modify the content and boundaries of the complex set of property domains that apply to PGR: private, state, common and public. More than a theoretical conundrum, we show that any realistic appraisal of the implementation of the international regulatory regimes in relation to PGR must acknowledge the conflicting and complex dynamics of these interrelated property domains, as well as the way in which they are being put into place on the ground.

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Private and Common Property Rights

Cited by 77 publications

References 503 publications

Policy analysis for tropical marine reserves: challenges and directions

Policy analysis for tropical marine reserves: challenges and directions

Coase-coloured Glasses and Rights Bundling: Why the Initial Specification of Water Rights in Volumetric Terms Matters

Shifting Common Spaces of Plant Genetic Resources in the International Regulation of Property

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