Privacy-preserving FairSwap: Fairness and privacy interplay

Avizheh, Sepideh; Haffey, Preston

doi:10.2478/popets-2022-0021

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…† Unlike to NFT, if a smart contact does not treat an auctioned item, then there is room for argument on whether exchange between the funds and the auctioned item is honestly run. Thus, it seems reasonable to employ fair exchange protocols, especially smart contract-based protocols [37]- [40] in addition to our protocol.…”

Section: Gas Prices For Running the Proposed Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

CHIN,

EMURA,

SATO

et al. 2024

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a "fund binding" property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.

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Section: Gas Prices For Running the Proposed Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

CHIN,

EMURA,

SATO

et al. 2024

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However it is considered within the margin of error due to the high 7 Unlike to NFT, if a smart contact does not treat an auctioned item, then there is room for argument on whether exchange between the funds and the auctioned item is honestly run. Thus, it seems reasonable to employ fair exchange protocols, especially smart contract-based protocols [3], [11], [12], [20] in addition to our protocol. 8 https://dune.xyz/queries/4294/11099 9 https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/ethereum volatility of gas price and ETH prices.…”

Section: A Gas Prices For Running the Proposed Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Chin¹,

Emura²,

Omote³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a "fund binding" property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealedbid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides fund binding, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al,. CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.

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Fair Private Set Intersection Using Smart Contracts

Avizheh,

Safavi-Naini

2024

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Privacy-preserving FairSwap: Fairness and privacy interplay

Cited by 4 publications

References 39 publications

A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Fair Private Set Intersection Using Smart Contracts

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