Privacy and Lack of Knowledge

Abstract

Two sorts of connections between privacy and knowledge (or lack thereof) have been suggested in the philosophical literature. First, Alvin Goldman has suggested that protecting privacy typically leads to less knowledge being acquired. Second, several other philosophers (e.g. Parent, Matheson, Blaauw and Peels) have claimed that lack of knowledge is definitive of having privacy. In other words, someone not knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else having privacy about that thing. Or equivalently, someone knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else losing privacy about that thing. In this paper, I argue that both of these suggestions are incorrect. I begin by arguing, contra Goldman, that protecting privacy often leads to more knowledge being acquired. I argue in the remainder of the paper, contra the defenders of the knowledge account of privacy, that someone knowing something is not necessary for someone else losing privacy about that thing.

To Believe, or Not to Believe – That is Not the (Only) Question: The Hybrid View of Privacy

“…The Belief and Justification-Based View Individual A has privacy regarding (a relevant) proposition p and with respect to individual B iff B lacks a belief that p and lacks justification for believing that p. 16 A's privacy may be diminished more when B knows p, compared to when B merely has a justified belief that p. For the sake of simplicity, we bracket this issue. See (Kappel 2013); (Fallis 2013); (Blaauw 2013). 13 This case is inspired by a case from (Fallis 2013: 165).…”

“…By contrast, some do endorse a stronger view according to which a privacy loss also requires that the belief is true, cp. (Matheson 2007); (Kappel 2013); (Fallis 2013). By contrast, (Allen 1988: 21-22) maintains that one can lose privacy regarding falsehoods.…”

An Indirect Argument for the Access Theory of Privacy

“…In itself, it says nothing about whether privacy is valuable, whether privacy rights exist, or what it takes to violate privacy rights if they do exist. (II) According to the CT, B must know f about A in order for A's privacy to be diminished relative to B and relative to f. Recent critics have pointed out that weaker epistemic relations than knowledge are sufficient for privacy to be diminished, and that the stronger the epistemic relation is, the more privacy is diminished (Blaauw 2013;Kappel 2013;Fallis 2013). I find this critique compelling, but I will bracket it for now, since it is fairly easy to see how a weaker epistemic relation can be replaced with 'knows' in the definition without turning it into something that is not a control theory.…”

“…A crucial motivation behind the AT is the idea that control does no work in determining whether someone has privacy or not. All that matters, according to the AT, is whether someone actually accesses f. It has recently been argued that the access in question is best understood as an actual epistemic access, and that the degree to which A's privacy is diminished depends inter alia on how strong the epistemic relation is between B and f (Blaauw 2013;Matheson 2007;Kappel 2013;Fallis 2013). Nothing of importance hangs on whether this specification of the AT is true, but for present purposes, it is helpful to think of the access in question as an actual epistemic access.…”

“…Several theorists have recently endorsed altered versions of this theory. See e.g (Blaauw 2013),(Kappel 2013), and(Fallis 2013)…”