2008
DOI: 10.1142/s0129183108012017
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Prisoner's Dilemma in One-Dimensional Cellular Automata: Visualization of Evolutionary Patterns

Abstract: The spatial Prisoner's Dilemma is a prototype model to show the emergence of cooperation in very competitive environments. It considers players, at site of lattices, that can either cooperate or defect when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma with other z players. This model presents a rich phase diagram. Here we consider players in cells of one-dimensional cellular automata. Each player interacts with other z players. This geometry allows us to vary, in a simple manner, the number of neighbors ranging from one up … Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…However, the total payoff of each player depends on the neighborhood, then, if the player belongs to a cooperative cluster he/she has a higher payoff than the player from a defective one. In the cooperative/defective clusters border, the differences among payoffs are essential to determine the system dynamics [15].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…However, the total payoff of each player depends on the neighborhood, then, if the player belongs to a cooperative cluster he/she has a higher payoff than the player from a defective one. In the cooperative/defective clusters border, the differences among payoffs are essential to determine the system dynamics [15].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If z is even, there are α = z/2 adjacent interacting players to the right and to the left hand side of this player. If z is odd, each side has α = (z − 1)/2 players and player i interacts with his/her own state (self-interaction) [15,19,20]. In addition to ρ 0 and z the other free parameter in this model is the temptation T in the conflict range 1 ≤ T ≤ 2.…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Several models have been considered within this theoretical framework since the original works proposed by Nowak and May [vid., for instance, Alonso-Sanz (2014); Fogarty et al (2012); Fu et al (2010); Gianetto and Heydari (2015); Grim (1997); Grujić et al (2014); Kirchkamp (2000); Qin et al (2008); Lindgren and Nordahl (1994); Nakamaru et al (1997); Oliphant (1994); Pereira et al (2008); Roca et al (2009) ;Schweitzer et al (2002); Szabó and Fath (2007); Vainstein and Arenzon (2001); Xia et al (2015)]. Traditionally, explicit motion is not included in these models, with strategies moving via imitation or colonisation of neighbouring sites.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%