Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School PrincipalsSherrilyn M. Billger In this study I examine the relationship between accountability (e.g., state sanctions for poor performance, or the presence of goals required by the district) and public secondary principal pay and school performance. Though such incentives and standards are increasingly common, the existing literature provides little evidence on the effectiveness of these policies. I explore cross-sectional variation in data from the Schools and Staffing Survey, and use quantile regressions where the conditional distributions of pay and school outcomes reflect variation in performance that is not observable in the data. I find that accountability coincides with lower college matriculation rates and lower principal pay, particularly for the best principals. On the other hand, accountability corresponds to higher retention rates at the worst schools. Though they may not be directly rewarded, school principals appear to act as agents for students in danger of dropping out. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S School Principals and Quality ImprovementsSchool principals are essential to improvements in school quality, presumably acting as agents for parents, school boards, and communities. In order to align the interests of all constituents, accountability standards have been implemented in many schools, tying compliance to school resources, reputation, and at times, educator pay. Indeed, as Cooley and Shen (2003) state, the school principal is "the key to accountability." Unfortunately, little is known about either the specific role of principals in generating school performance or the factors that enable a principal to respond to incentives and improve school quality. To investigate these issues, this study examines the relationship between accountability and principal compensation and student outcomes, noting factors that likely hinder or enable improvement. In this context, accountability includes districtand school-level factors such as performance goals, school reports, and sanctions, as well as statelevel sanctions for poor performance. A school is assumed to be "accountable" if it faces at least one of these measures, regardless of whether it has directly faced sanctions.The relationship between accountability and salary or school performance reveals the manner in which school principals act as ...

The Direct and Interactive Effects of Middle and Upper Managerial Quality on Organizational Performance

“…To create a middle manager quality measure, it is necessary to identify the factors that influence a principal’s salary. According to a common salary model from the literature, these factors fall into four categories: district characteristics, human capital factors, personal characteristics, and past performance (Billger, 2007; Educational Research Service, 2008-2009; Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, & Ehrenberg, 1988a, 1988b; Stone, 1985). The first category comprises district characteristics.…”

“…Personal characteristics, such as race and gender, also affect salary (Billger, 2007; Landau, 1995; Tallerico, 2000; Weil & Kimball, 1996). Minority principals may have a higher salary because of a district’s desire to increase diversity and attract and hire quality minority principals (Landau, 1995; Tallerico, 2000; Weil & Kimball, 1996).…”

“…The fourth factor is the relationship between salary and performance. This relationship is reciprocal in that past performance affects middle manager quality, and middle manager quality then affects future performance (Billger, 2007; Meier & O’Toole, 2002; Stone, 1985). Therefore, to control for the effect of past performance on middle manager quality, it is necessary to adjust for this endogeneity, or the effect of middle manager quality will be biased downward.…”

How Career Concerns Influence Public Workers' Effort: Evidence from the Teacher Labor Market

“…instance Brewer 1993;Billger 2007;Clark et al 2009;and Horng et al 2009). According to these studies, principals' managerial skills appear to make a significant difference on the operation of the school and the outcome of students.…”

Principal Accountability at Private Secondary Schools

“…Some recent studies of public school accountability includeHastings and Weinstein (2007),Billger (2007), andHanushek and Raymond (2005).…”