2011
DOI: 10.1093/logcom/exr040
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Prime implicates and relevant belief revision

Abstract: This article discusses Parikh's axiom of relevance in belief revision, and recalls some results from Kourousias and Makinson (2007, J. Symbolic Logic, 72, 994-1002) in this context. The crucial distinction is emphasized between the uniqueness of the finest splitting of K and the fact that K has several normal forms associated with that finest splitting. The main new result of this article is a new proof for the theorem that the set of prime implicates of K is a normal form for the finest splitting of K. It is … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2012
2012
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
3
3

Relationship

0
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 9 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Many studies focused on belief change within the framework of propositional logic fragments, particularly on belief revision [4,17,51,41,6], belief merging [7], belief update [11] and belief contraction [15,46,2,49,14,50]. However, as far as we know, research in belief contraction has been mainly devoted to the Horn fragment and belief erasure has attracted no attention.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many studies focused on belief change within the framework of propositional logic fragments, particularly on belief revision [4,17,51,41,6], belief merging [7], belief update [11] and belief contraction [15,46,2,49,14,50]. However, as far as we know, research in belief contraction has been mainly devoted to the Horn fragment and belief erasure has attracted no attention.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many studies focused on belief change within the framework of propositional logic fragments, particularly on belief contraction [2,37,14], on belief revision [4,13,38,32,6] and more recently on belief merging [7]. However, as far as we know, the problem of belief update within fragments of propositional logic has not been addressed so far, except for complexity results in the Horn case [17,30].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is an extensive literature on the theory of belief revision. [7][8][9][10] Actually, it was started with the work of Alchourrón et al 11 in 1985, which was studied from the perspective of structural properties of reasoning about believes. In recent years, some dynamic logical models of belief and knowledge have been developed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%