Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the kinds of delegate allocation rules used in Democratic presidential primaries (Winner-Take-All, Districted, and Proportional) and the power of various states within the national Democratic party. It demonstrates that these rules are often, in the short run, more important than a state's voters in determining the fate of particular candidates. It shows, in the middle run, that different types of states are clearly favored by different sets of primary regulations. It closes with some speculation about the long-run impact of these tendencies.

Measuring the Consequences of Delegate Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations

“…In addition, a more general pattern that emerges from table 3 is that the eventual winner usually had an advantage. As is widely thought (Lengle and Shafer 1976), rules treat the eventual winner neutrally or favor him. Bias in favor of the eventual winner exists in at least one category of selection rules, and against at least one other candidate, in five of our seven presidential nomination contests.…”

“…Furthermore, a highly responsive nomination system is likely to lead to an early victory by a presidential candidate if votes follow some autoregressive process, as would be described by campaign "momentum" (Bartels 1988), or if voters do not change their preferences but clearly do prefer one of the candidates.' Party professionals (and likely frontrunners) prefer early nomination decisions because it seems to increase the chances for a victory in November (Lengle and Shafer 1976;Lengle 1981, 85-99;Keech and Matthews 1976;David and Ceaser 1980, 69-74). One reason for this is that an early decision gives the nominee more time to prepare for the Fall campaign.…”

Social Movements and Party Politics: The Case of the Christian Right

“…Indeed, an often unarticulated assumption is that demographic differences and issue disagreements can be resolved if party activists are committed to the political process and if the process itself encourages cooperation (Green and Guth 1994). This disagreement is a staple of several literatures, including studies of "amateur" and "professional" activists (Wilson 1962;Conway and Feigert 1968) and research on the consequences of party and electoral rules (Lengle and Shafer 1976;Lengle, Owen, and Sonner 1995;Reiter 1985). It could be, of course, that movement activists become incorporated into the ranks of party activists over time, a result that would support elements of both points of view.…”

Caucuses and Primaries

“…Caucus convention systems, delegate selection primary states, and proportional representation primaries-taken as groups-all performed about equally well in giving presidential candidates a fair share of national convention delegates. Unlike 1972, under-and overrepresentation in the 1976 nomination races apparently &dquo;balanced out.&dquo; In 1972 Senator McGovern benefited disproportionately from delegate allocation formulas; competing in a multiple candidate field, his plurality victories typically netted McGovern more than a proportionate share of delegates (Lengle and Shafer, 1976). In 1976, however, the extra delegates received by a candidate in some states were nearly balanced out by a smaller-than-proportionate number in other states (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, 1976: 1421.…”