Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment.

Taylor, Gabriele

doi:10.2307/2185420

Cited by 62 publications

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“…Cf. Taylor (1985) for helpful discussion of the sense in which pride might have the self as its object.…”

Section: An Objection: Why Inclusivity?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account

Callahan

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In this paper I propose a new account of the virtue of intellectual humility (henceforth usually abbreviated IH): IH is freedom, in one's thinking, from prideful distraction by one's intellectual ego. The person with IH enjoys a certain relative ability to think clearly or focus; her intellectual energies are not often diverted by thoughts about her own status or intellectual abilities, and her thinking does not suffer distortion from the need to validate her own beliefs, as such. I call this the no-distraction account of IH.The no-distraction account, I'll suggest, is broadly attractive. It does a plausible job of classifying cases of intellectual (non) humility and echoes longstanding thought from various traditions about the value of humility. It also achieves a particular -potentially controversial but by my lights very important and, indeed, underappreciated -desideratum on accounts of IH: the desideratum of inclusivity. That is, it casts IH as a trait that would be valuable and appropriate in any context, including in contexts of oppression and marginalization. This is not an easy desideratum to achieve. One might initially be tempted to think that IH requires, e.g., regularly calling to mind one's intellectual limitations, or a general willingness to defer to other people, or a relatively low or moderate confidence in one's own opinions. But people in contexts of oppression and marginalization are often poorly served by all of those things. What we might naturally take to be required by IH would be inappropriate, dangerous, and detrimental in their lives. 1 Indeed, these forms of (by my lights) pseudo-IH would be dangerous or inappropriate even in some cases where an individual is -in some respects -highly privileged. Consider the much-publicized story of Serena Williams's first postpartum experience, which has been taken to highlight the struggle of Black mothers to be heard and taken seriously within the healthcare system (even when they are also famous athletes!):Serena Williams knew her body well enough to listen when it told her something was wrong. Winner of 23 Grand Slam singles titles, she'd been playing tennis since age 1 Cf. discussion in, e.g., Dular (2017), Jones (2012), and Hazlett (2017, who each detail ways in which being a member of an oppressed group can already cause one to feel unconfident or uncertain about many of one's beliefs.

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“…Cf. Taylor (1985) for helpful discussion of the sense in which pride might have the self as its object.…”

Section: An Objection: Why Inclusivity?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account

Callahan

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…There are several hints in the original text that Kostelnička, not having any children of her own, actually doesn't understand what a mother's loveunconditional loveamounts to, even though she is at the same time reported to have done a great deal to win God's favour to have a baby. 16 For a classic distinction, see Taylor (1985), ch. "Pride and Humiliation", and more recently Fischer (2012).…”

Section: Self-love and Pridementioning

confidence: 99%

“…See, for example,Taylor (1985),Ben-Ze'ev (2006),Gaita (2002),Cordner (2007) andBuber (1958).4 See, for example,Williams (1993),Calhoun (2004),Sánchez (2014) and, for a combined position,Murphy (1999).5 Slightly diverging from contemporary practice, I retain the distinction between guilt (the state of being guilty or of being blameworthy, see footnote 2) and guilt feelings (the state of feeling guilty).…”

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confidence: 99%

Remorse and Self-love: Kostelnička’s Change of Heart

Pacovská

2021

J Ethics

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Does remorse imply self-hatred? In this paper, I argue that self-hatred is a false response to one's wrongdoing because it is corrupted by the vice of pride, which affects the perception of its object. To identify the detrimental operation of pride, I propose to study the process of change of heart and its impediments. I use the example of Kostelnička, from Janáček's opera Jenůfa, to show that the impediment to remorse is active already as a source of wrongdoing and self-deception. I identify three different aspects of Kostelnička's pride: social ambition, defensive anger and moral ambition. I show that it is pride as moral ambition that prevents the wrongdoer's acknowledgment of her blameworthiness by causing her obsession with her blameless self-image and corrupting her self-love. In the last part of the paper, I reject Kostelnička's initial self-hatred before her change of heart, because it is not based on an accurate judgement of her agency. Kostelnička's true remorse is thereupon connected with her inner transformation towards humility and with a reorientation of her attention towards the victim of her wrongdoing, as testified in her plea for forgiveness. The implied moral improvement and reconstitution of her relationship to herself and others opens the way for her coming to terms with her guilt.Keywords: guilt feelings and remorse, change of heart, self-deceptive wrongdoing, corrupted self-love, pride and humility, moral ambition 1 Self-hatred thus involves both self-loathing (based on "global" negative evaluation of the person as such) and the corresponding behaviour that damages one's well-being, such as self-torment, destructive behaviour and even suicide. I am following here Aristotle's remarks on hatred (Aristotle 1382a15) as developed by Ben-Ze'ev (2000: 382).

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“…Most accounts of emotions like pride and shame understand them to be essentially reflexive, always evaluating their targets in ways that reflect well or poorly on oneself (Isenberg, 1973;Davidson, 1980;Taylor, 1985;Helm, 2001). I now think this is a mistake.…”

Section: Love As Intimate Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Love as Intimate Identification

Helm¹

2010

Love, Friendship, and the Self

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This chapter argues that to love someone is to be intimately concerned for his well-being as this particular person. Such intimate concern is cashed out in terms of intimate identification: having a concern for his identity, understood in terms of the sharing of his cares and values for his sake, that is analogous to, but not identical with, your concern for your own identity. This account of love enables us to make sense of the idea that love is essentially for particular persons, the way love essentially involves trust and respect, and the intuitive depth of our feelings of pride, shame, and other person-focused emotions focused on others.

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Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment.

Cited by 62 publications

References 0 publications

Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account

Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account

Remorse and Self-love: Kostelnička’s Change of Heart

Love as Intimate Identification

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