Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues

Bradford, Richard

doi:10.1016/0377-2217(95)00265-0

Cited by 40 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…There exists a critical p , meaning that the internal firm will set a higher price than the commercial firm in period 1. This result is different from the conclusions of Mendelson and Whang (1990), Bradford (1996) and Afeche and Mendelson (2004). They all demonstrated that the optimal price of a particular customer class in the profit maximization model was always higher than the corresponding optimal price in the net value maximization model.…”

Section: Numerical Analysiscontrasting

confidence: 82%

Optimal and incentive compatible pricing for heterogeneous periods

Chen

Zhang

Huang

2008

J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng.

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This paper studies a service firm whose business time can be divided into several periods, each providing different value to customers. Heterogeneous service is a major reason resulting in imbalances between supply and demand. Since customers differ in their degree of impatience, firms can use differential pricing mechanisms to optimize their objectives and match supply with demand in each period, by inducing customers to choose different periods. We study two types of firms, an internal firm, the objective of which is to maximize the system's (including the firm and all the customers) total net value, and a commercial firm, which aims to optimize its own profit. Though impatience factors are customers' private information, for each type of firm, we derive the optimal incentive compatible pricing policy, under which all the coming customers will follow the firm's assignment, that is, patient customers will buy the service in high-value periods, but their waiting time will be longer, while impatient customers will enter into the low-value periods, but they will be compensated by shorter waiting times. Furthermore, in the internal firm, we also prove that this mechanism enables the decentralization of decisions, while maintaining centralized system-wide optimality. Numerical analysis shows that when there is sufficient capacity, the internal firm does not always need to set lower prices than the commercial firm in every period.

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Section: Numerical Analysiscontrasting

confidence: 82%

Optimal and incentive compatible pricing for heterogeneous periods

Chen

Zhang

Huang

2008

J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng.

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show abstract

“…Bradford (1996) and Lederer and Li (1997) discussed a multipleagent case with different waiting or delay costs. Ugarte and Oren (2000) compared the efficiency of three coordination policies of internal supply chains: Centralized command and control, centralized revelation, and decentralized revelation.…”

Section: Revelation Mechanism Designmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Since Myerson (1979) gave the revelation principle, considerable researchers devoted themselves to establish incentive schemes to induce truthful information (see, Bradford, 1996;Lim, 2000;Ugarte and Oren, 2000;Sen, 2005;Hempelmann, 2006). Bradford (1996) and Lederer and Li (1997) discussed a multipleagent case with different waiting or delay costs.…”

Section: Revelation Mechanism Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor

Xiao

Yang

2009

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…where it is to be remembered that P, is a function of (N,a -~ N,B) through (2) and c,r is a functmn of (Nlr+ N2~) through (1). We solve the problem by first using ordinary Lagranglan methods to find the values of N t A, N2A, and N2B that maxanuze (4) subject to equahty constraints (7b) and (7c), then a is calculated from (7a) The non-negativity constrmnt for Nza as then checked, and is imposed as an equahty if needed.…”

Section: No-toll Reg~ne (Nt): T a = T B =mentioning

confidence: 99%