Pricing Policies in a Retailer Stackelberg O2O Green Supply Chain

Wan, Gan; Kou, Gang; Li, Tie; Xiao, Feng; Yang, Chen

doi:10.3390/su12083236

Cited by 4 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…. , according to Equation (11). From Equation (11), the constraints of the model determine the feasible domain (i.e., the range of values taken) of p 1 (t) and p 2 (t), and this feasible domain varies with t. A diagram of the feasible domain of the model in period t if a right-angle coordinate system is constructed with p 1 (t) as the horizontal axis and p 2 (t) as the vertical axis is shown in Figure 2.…”

Section: Model Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…where * 2 ( 1) p t  denotes the optimal offer of firm 2 in period t − 1 according to Equation (11), and * 1 ( ) p t denotes the optimal offer of firm 1 in period t , t = 1, 2, 3, …, according to Equation (11). From Equation (11), the constraints of the model determine the feasible domain (i.e., the range of values taken) of 1 ( ) p t and 2 ( ) p t , and this feasible domain varies with t. A diagram of the feasible domain of the model in period t if a right-angle coordinate system is constructed with 1 ( ) p t as the horizontal axis and 2 ( ) p t as the vertical axis is shown in Figure 2. The specific process for solving the game equilibrium solution of this nonlinear bilevel programming model according to Equation ( 12) is given below and is shown in Figure 3.…”

Section: Model Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…responding to the first objective function in Equation ( 12) in period t, 2 ( ) L p t denotes the axis of symmetry corresponding to the second objective function in Equation ( 12) at period t, 1 L p denotes the axis of symmetry corresponding to the first objective function in Equation ( 12) at equilibrium, and 2 L p denotes the axis of symmetry corresponding to the second objective function in Equation ( 12) at equilibrium; these special cases can be found according to the relationship between the axis of symmetry and the feasible domain. The specific expression for the above axis of symmetry can be derived from the expressions for the two objective functions in Equation (11) as…”

Section: Model Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zarouri et al [10] used the Stackelberg model to study a problem related to dynamic pricing in a perishable supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and two production and distribution periods. Gan et al [11] utilized the retailer Stackelberg game model to inconsistent pricing strategies for the online channel and offline channel of the O2O supply chain. Guo et al [12] used the Stackelberg game to study a problem related to the pricing game regarding two service providers with homogeneous consumers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-Oligopoly Sequential Pricing Mechanisms and Their Game Analysis in Raw Material Supply Chains

2022

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The sequential pricing game model is an approach that can be effectively used to solve the problem with multi-oligopoly pricing mechanisms in raw material supply chains. However, the existing sequential pricing mechanism does not fully consider constraints such as the purchase volume of downstream firms and the change information of each parameter, which leads to the pricing mechanism being detached from the real market. According to the concept of the sequential pricing game model being used among multi-oligopolies under constraints, we constructed the constrained sequential pricing game model by incorporating the parameters related to the product demand function, marginal production cost, dominant coefficient, following coefficient, and agreed minimum purchase volume as constraints, and the model was converted into a nonlinear bilevel programming model to facilitate model solving. Furthermore, we provided the analytical solution formulas for six special cases, thus making the model more similar to the real market. In addition, the effects of the agreed minimum purchase volume and the dominant and following coefficients on the equilibrium quoted prices and profits of the firms were analyzed. The results of the numerical simulation show that the constrained sequential pricing game model is more effective than the unconstrained sequential pricing game model in solving the problem with the multi-oligopoly pricing mechanism, which means that it can be used to establish a better pricing mechanism and provide a more reasonable and scientific basis for market operation and policymakers in solving practical problems.

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Section: Model Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model Solvingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-Oligopoly Sequential Pricing Mechanisms and Their Game Analysis in Raw Material Supply Chains

2022

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“…Moreover, the optimal decisions of the CLSC members are obtained by developing the Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as a leader and retailer as a follower. The Stackelberg game models are widely used by numerous researchers such as Che et al [62], Wan et al [63], Su et al [64], Li et al [65], etc. to determine the optimal decision variables in various settings.…”

Section: Research Gapmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition

Singhal

Jena

Aich³

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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Business organizations all around the globe are looking to expand circular models into their supply chains to harness economic and environmental benefits. Moreover, the act of giving incentives to retailers by the manufacturer is also quite prevalent in the present business environment. These incentives are offered to promote the sales of products of a manufacturer. Therefore, this paper examines the optimal decisions for a dual-retailer closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in which the manufacturer bestows the credit period to the one retailer (a firm that possesses shallow market penetration and has a higher insistence on the usage of the capital venture), and cash discount to the next retailer (a firm that occupies the market to a greater extent and receives lower thrust on the usage of invested capital) under a non-coordinated system and coordinated systems. This study proposes the mathematical model to determine the optimal decisions of the manufacturer in terms of credit period and cash discount and also compute the optimal decisions of the retailers for their retail prices and order quantities to maximize individual’s profit in the CLSC. Moreover, numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis is performed to get insights into the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and retailers. The results of sensitivity analysis show that credit period and cash discount increases with the rise in price elasticity, and decreases with an increase in cross-price elasticity. The findings also confirm that members of dual-retailer CLSC under coordination and manufacture’s incentive scenario generate higher environmental and economic benefits required to attain sustainability in production and consumption.

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Defining online to offline (O2O): a systematic approach to defining an emerging business model

Lee

Feiyu

Chau

2022

INTR

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PurposeA new business model online to offline (O2O) has emerged in recent years. Similar to many new models at an early stage, O2O has inconsistent definitions which not only inhibit its adoption but also poorly differentiate O2O from other existing business models. To resolve the two issues, the authors propose an approach of definition development.Design/methodology/approachTo show the usefulness of the approach, the authors demonstrate the differences among O2O and other business models with the use of the distinctive definition and thereby evaluate adoption of O2O from a practical perspective and identify research directions from a theoretical perspective based on the differences.FindingsThe authors' proposed approach of definition development integrates the work of Tatarkiewicz (1980) and Nickerson et al. (2013). The approach generates a distinctive definition of O2O with important analytical dimensions which help decision-making of adoption of O2O.Originality/valueThe paper aims to make several contributions. First, on theoretical contribution, the authors confine the scope of O2O studies and facilitate accumulation of more coherent knowledge of O2O. The authors help O2O evolve from a “buzz word” of successful stories in real businesses to a more serious concept from an academic perspective. Second, from a practical perspective, the authors' definition provides business executives with critical evaluative dimensions for gauging the adoption of O2O. Lastly, from a methodological perspective, the proposed approach can be used in future to define an emerging concept in real life businesses.

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Pricing Policies in a Retailer Stackelberg O2O Green Supply Chain

Cited by 4 publications

References 36 publications

Multi-Oligopoly Sequential Pricing Mechanisms and Their Game Analysis in Raw Material Supply Chains

Multi-Oligopoly Sequential Pricing Mechanisms and Their Game Analysis in Raw Material Supply Chains

Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition

Defining online to offline (O2O): a systematic approach to defining an emerging business model

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