1983
DOI: 10.2307/3145658
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Pricing Policies for Antlerless Elk Hunting Permits

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Cited by 12 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Our focus is on differentiating between groups at this aggregate level. Readers interested in estimating nonmarket values for big game using various approaches see Balkan & Kahn (1988); Boxall (1995); Creel & Loomis (1990); Loomis (1982); Loomis, Donnelly, Sorg, & Oldenburg (1985) and Sandrey, Buccola, & Brown (1983).…”
Section: Modeling Lottery Applications Across Huntsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our focus is on differentiating between groups at this aggregate level. Readers interested in estimating nonmarket values for big game using various approaches see Balkan & Kahn (1988); Boxall (1995); Creel & Loomis (1990); Loomis (1982); Loomis, Donnelly, Sorg, & Oldenburg (1985) and Sandrey, Buccola, & Brown (1983).…”
Section: Modeling Lottery Applications Across Huntsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Abatement methods that reduce the damage caused by wildlife can be graded according to the harm caused to the animals, where hunting is the most harmful abatement method (Rollins et al 1996;Yoder 2000). Public policies that control abatement include incentives for changes in hunting pressure, incentives for non-lethal abatement methods such as translocation of problem animals, scare devices, guard dogs, barriers, and improved livestock husbandry (Sandry et al 1983;Rollins et al 1996;Breck and Meier 2004). Abatement strategies for reducing damage have been examined by means of cost-benefit analysis, e.g., for supplemental feeding programs for black bears to reduce forestry damage (Ziegltrum 2006), and cost-efficiency analysis, e.g., with regard to the trade-off between fox culling and various prevention measures for sheep farms (Moberly et al 2004).…”
Section: Wildlife Payment Programs and Economic Incentives For Wildlimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An argument in favor of keeping prices for deer tags low has been that since legally deer belong to the people of each state, the state should not charge a high price for use of this resource. Lotteries and other allocation mechanisms are regularly used to limit the number of tags issued: Sandrey et al [20], Hussain and Tschirhart [21], Roach et al [22]. Wildlife managers who allocate the tags do not have authority to raise prices, but by increasing the number of tags can often increase revenue to their department.…”
Section: H1mentioning
confidence: 99%