2010
DOI: 10.1109/tvt.2010.2049757
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Pricing Games for Distributed Cooperative Transmission

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Cited by 14 publications
(12 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
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“…Other problems that have been formulated in terms of potential games are found in routing [9], [97], [156], [157], [186], [203], BS/AP selection [98], [99], [112], [161], [172], cooperative transmissions [4], [139], secrecy rate maximization [11], code design for radar [146], broadcasting [35], spectrum market [87], network coding [115], [147], [148], data cashing [94], social networks [40], computation offloading [42], localization [79], and demand-side management in smart grids [77], [183]. …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other problems that have been formulated in terms of potential games are found in routing [9], [97], [156], [157], [186], [203], BS/AP selection [98], [99], [112], [161], [172], cooperative transmissions [4], [139], secrecy rate maximization [11], code design for radar [146], broadcasting [35], spectrum market [87], network coding [115], [147], [148], data cashing [94], social networks [40], computation offloading [42], localization [79], and demand-side management in smart grids [77], [183]. …”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It should be pointed out that game G differs from many conventional non-cooperative game models where players' utilities couple with each other but strategy spaces are independent (see, e.g., [16]). In contrast, it is interesting to note that players in game G have coupled strategy spaces but their associated utilities are independent.…”
Section: Flow Directionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, it is interesting to note that players in game G have coupled strategy spaces but their associated utilities are independent. Therefore, the approach used in [16] cannot be directly applied in this article. Instead, we resort to other approaches to tackle game G, especially in distributed algorithms design, as shown in the forthcoming sections.…”
Section: Flow Directionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Practically, the available relay nodes may not cooperate and share their power unless provided with some reimbursement. 24 This motivated us to propose an incentive-based CG for optimal power allocation in multirelay cooperative networks. In this paper, we have formulated an integrated game theoretic framework based on SG and CG.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%