2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) 2012
DOI: 10.1109/icc.2012.6364630
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Pricing for open access femtocell networks using market equilibrium and non-cooperative game

Abstract: Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.In this paper, we address the pricing problem in open-access femtocell networks. We use economic and game theoretic approaches such as market equilibrium and non-cooperative game to propose novel pricing schemes. In our proposed solutions, the per unit price of spectrum can be determined dynamically and mobile service providers can gain more revenue than the fixed pricing scheme. Furthermore, in our so… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
6
0
1

Year Published

2016
2016
2019
2019

Publication Types

Select...
4
1

Relationship

0
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 7 publications
(7 citation statements)
references
References 13 publications
0
6
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…When the RF nodes notice that the source requests to buy their spectrum due to its nonfunctional FSO link condition, a two-player game will be operated between the source and each RF nodes. In this paper, we consider a market-equilibrium-based pricing approach for the spectrum trading game [25], [35], [36] where the source is treated as the buyer and the RF relay nodes are treated as the sellers. It is assumed that different RF nodes are not aware of each other 3 and each seller has to negotiate with the source and sets their price independently to meet the buyer's demand according to their own utilities.…”
Section: B Spectrum Trading Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…When the RF nodes notice that the source requests to buy their spectrum due to its nonfunctional FSO link condition, a two-player game will be operated between the source and each RF nodes. In this paper, we consider a market-equilibrium-based pricing approach for the spectrum trading game [25], [35], [36] where the source is treated as the buyer and the RF relay nodes are treated as the sellers. It is assumed that different RF nodes are not aware of each other 3 and each seller has to negotiate with the source and sets their price independently to meet the buyer's demand according to their own utilities.…”
Section: B Spectrum Trading Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [20], an oligopoly market for traffic offloading is considered, where multiple buyers and sellers compete to maximize their utilities. Two pricing schemes, market equilibrium and non-cooperative game, are presented for determining spectrum price.…”
Section: Stackelberg Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nash equilibrium [20] Incentives are designed for the case of a single MNO and two different SCOs (small cell operators) with overlapping coverage areas.…”
Section: Stackelberg Gamementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The spectrum access in these networks could be closed access, open access, and hybrid access. Chen et al [18] and Tehrani and Uysal [19] deal with the spectrum trading problem in open and hybrid access mode of HetNets in which femto‐cells support macro‐users for interference management through the network. The problem of spectrum trading in closed access HetNets in which each femto‐cell is managed by an independent authority and is not ought to support macro‐users is a newly popular challenge.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%