Pricing Decision for Reverse Logistics System under Cross-Competitive Take-Back Mode Based on Game Theory

Abstract

Considering the reverse logistics system composed of two manufacturers and two recyclers under the cross-competitive take-back mode, which is influenced by multiple factors (industry competition, economies of scale, government subsidies, remanufacturing rate, etc.), a model for remanufacturing reverse logistics system based on Stackelberg game is established. Then, the Nash equilibrium solution of decision variables is solved to obtain the best profit of all participants under the cross-competitive take-back mode. Furthermore, the parameter constraint analysis is carried out, and the monopolistic take-back mode is introduced for comparative analysis. Then, the sensitivity analysis of the model is carried out. At last, a case analysis is carried out based on the current situation of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling in China. The results show that the cross-competitive take-back mode is more advantageous to all participants in the reverse logistics system than the monopolistic take-back mode. Recyclers should actively sign contracts with multiple manufacturers to recycle waste products, making full use of the advantages of cross-competitive take-back mode to maximize the profits of all participants, so as to encourage them to recycle waste products and achieve sustainable development.

Decision Making in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with a Waste Management Program: Manufacturers’ Take-Back Activity and Governmental Subsidies for Remanufacturing

“…Huang and Wang [31] explored three types of take-back models in a hybrid remanufacturing system, manufacturer's take-back, distributor's take-back, and third-party's take-back, and showed that all the received profits of supply chain members from the take-back activities are even larger than those from non-take-back activities. Feng et al [32] considered the cross-competitive take-back mode in a CLSC consisting of two manufacturers and found that cross-competitive take-back is even more beneficial to all supply chain members than monopolistic take-back. Pazoki and Samarghandi [33] and Chang et al [34] investigated how take-back regulations imposed by the government encourage remanufacturing or eco-design.…”

“…Refs. [28,29,[31][32][33][34][35] focused on take-back activities in CLSCs but did not consider coalition strategies. With increasing concerns about the sustainable operation of supply chains, devising the optimal coalition strategies is indeed a universally significant task for supply chain members.…”

Exploring Industry-Specific Research Themes on E-Waste: A Literature Review

“…Reviews, evaluation studies, and game theory are found in seven papers. Interestingly, the authors of all seven game-theory-model papers [60,[64][65][66][67][68][69] 2 presents the categorizations of all 87 papers based on research subjects and methodologies adopted by authors. The survey-based methodology is the most prominent one adopted by most authors, with 21 papers, followed by mathematical modeling papers, with 9 papers.…”

“…Reviews, evaluation studies, and game theory are found in seven papers. Interestingly, the authors of all seven game-theory-model papers [60,[64][65][66][67][68][69] are based in China. Table 4 presents the concentration of research fields pursued by the authors.…”

Multi-criteria analysis of the feasibility of e-waste pre-treatment units in a Brazilian city

“…There are many formal institutions operating WEEE chains in Brazil, including cooperatives, logistics companies and recyclers (CEMPRE 2020). RL can generate economic and social bene ts, enabling the emergence of new businesses, generating work and income (SOUZA et al 2015;FENG et al 2019; SAHAJWALLA; HOSSAIN 2020). It is worth emphasizing the importance of studies that provide decisionmakers with effective information and tools for the analysis and optimization of RL scenarios (RODRIGUES; MONDELLI 2021).…”