Pricing and two-tier advertising with one manufacturer and one retailer

Szmerekovsky, Joseph G.; Zhang, Jiang

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2007.10.005

Cited by 122 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Yue et al [15] study the issue of cooperative advertisement in a production-distribution supply chain in which the demand is sensitive to the price and the manufacturer o ers price discounts to the distributor. Szmerekovsky and Zhang [16] investigate the issue of pricing and determination of advertising policy in a bi-level supply chain where the demand depends on the retail price and advertising expenditure. Xie et al [17,18] further extend this study and compare cooperative scenario with the two previously mentioned scenarios in which no cooperation is assumed between the manufacturer and the retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

2017

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Abstract. This paper studies a bi-level decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one distributor. Along with global advertising, the manufacturer participates in part of local advertising expenditure incurred by the distributor. Bi-level programming is applied to model the relationship between the manufacturer and distributer under two power scenarios of Stackelberg game framework. In the rst scenario, we consider the manufacturer as the leader and in the latter, we allow the distributer to act as the dominant member of the supply chain. In order to tackle bi-level programming models, a meta-heuristic genetic algorithm with hierarchical structure is developed for each scenario and optimal policies for the members in terms of pricing, advertising, inventory, and demand allocation are determined. Finally, several computational experiments are conducted on the data obtained from an automotive spare parts supply chain to demonstrate the validity of the developed models and compare the bene ts of members as well as of the entire system.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

2017

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“…Yue et al, [14] and Szmerekovsky and Zhang [15] developed a price discount model to coordinate the advertising expenditures of the two parties in a two-echelon supply chain. They assumed that the consumer demand is dependent on the retail price and co-op advertising expenditure.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and advertising decisions in a dominant-retailer supply chain: A multi-follower bi-level programming approach

Mokhlesian

Zegordi

2017

Scientia Iranica

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Pricing and advertising is one of the most important decisions in each supply chain especially in the competitive environment. In the previous studies, this is as a centralized decision. However, if each channel member makes its decision independently, the utility of all members is optimized. In such decentralized situations, the channel members may have different market power that they influence on the other members' decisions. These issues can modeled through leader-follower Stackelberg game or bi-level programming. This study investigates coordination of pricing and cooperative advertising in a two-stage supply chain consisting of one dominant-retailer and multiple competitive manufactures which produce several perishable and substitutable products. This paper aims to determine pricing and cooperative advertising decisions expenditure as well as the amount of manufacturers' production or retailer's purchase such that utility of all members is met. Hence, the problem is modeled as a multifollower bi-level programming problem. Since it is proved that the model is NP-hard, the proposed model is solved

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“…Different cooperative advertising models have been studied more sufficiently in the forward supply chain (FSC) [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32] including two excellent reviews [22,23]. On the other hand, advertising occupies a crucial position in promoting the quantity of collected used products [33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

2017

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Improper disposal of household unwanted medications (UMs) is an emergency problem around the world that adversely affects the sustainability of the environment and human's health. However, the current disposal practices, mainly based on advertising and collecting status, are unsatisfactory in most countries and regions. Thus, some scholars proposed an alternative disposal practice that is to provide incentives to customers. This study aims to compare a Single Model (advertising only) with a Joint Model (advertising with take-back pricing) in a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) that is composed of one disposer and one collector. In each model, four games (non-cooperative, collector as the Stackelberg leader, disposer as the Stackelberg leader, and cooperative) were established in order to identify the optimal pricing and advertising strategies for both members. The results of the study indicate that there is a Pareto dominant range for Joint Model compared to Single Model, whereas Single Model has no Pareto improvement in any games. Furthermore, in non-cooperative games of Joint Model, it is better to implement the leader-follower structure rather than simultaneous movement structure. Additionally, it is verified that the cooperative game is feasible, which leads to the cooperation between the disposer and the collector, and the extra profit from the cooperation can be shared based on the Nash bargaining game. However, in Single Model, it is better for the disposer to act as a channel leader and the collector figures the follower.

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Pricing and two-tier advertising with one manufacturer and one retailer

Cited by 122 publications

References 17 publications

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

Pricing and advertising decisions in a dominant-retailer supply chain: A multi-follower bi-level programming approach

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

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