Price discrimination with partial information: Does it pay off?

Esteves, Rosa Branca

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.011

Cited by 23 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In a recent article, Esteves (2009) proposes a model where consumers di¤er in their preferences both for a brand name and a product. However, in her analysis consumers are homogeneous in transportation costs (both in the brand and product di¤erentiation dimensions).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals

Jentzsch

Sapi

Suleymanova

2013

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals

Jentzsch

Sapi

Suleymanova

2013

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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“…Leslie (2004) argues that price discrimination improves the industry profits while it does not have impact to the consumer surplus. Esteves (2009) goes further on this argument by revealing the importance of considering consumer preference information on the price discrimination. On the other hand, Orbach and Einav (2007) analyzes the uniform pricing policy in film industry and argues that price discrimination would bring more profits to film exhibitors via change on legal constraints.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…It is vital for the service provider to identify potential customers who are able to and willing to purchase the ticket at an affordable price through a real time negotiation rather than to leave the seats uncharged. According to (Esteves 2009), personalized pricing or price discrimination can increase industry profit when the service providers can have preference information of consumers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agent based mobile negotiation for personalized pricing of last minute theatre tickets

Lee

Lee³

2012

Expert Systems with Applications

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This paper proposes an agent based mobile negotiation framework for personalized pricing of last minutes theatre tickets whose values are dependent on the time remaining to the performance and the locations of potential customers. In particular, case based reasoning and fuzzy cognitive map techniques are adopted in the negotiation framework to identify the best initial offer zone and adopt multi criteria decision in the scoring function to evaluate offers. The proposed framework is tested via a computer simulation in which personalized pricing policy shows higher market performance than other policies therefore the validity of the proposed negotiation framework.

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“…The market is said to be "weak" if the reverse happens. 11 Esteves (2009b) extends the Thisse and Vives model to a two-dimensional differentiation model and shows that price discrimination might not necessarily lead to the prisoner's dilemma result. This happens when firms observe the location of consumers in the less differentiation dimension and price discriminate accordingly while they remain ignorant about their location in the more differentiated dimension.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

Pricing with customer recognition

Esteves

2010

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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JEL classification: D43 L13Keywords: Competitive behaviour-based price discrimination Discrete distribution of consumer preferences Economic effects This article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour-based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers' preferences is discrete. Consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking. In the static and first-period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies. When price discrimination is allowed, forward-looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition, thus the probability that both will have positive first-period sales decreases as they become more patient. Furthermore, an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists, yielding a 100-0 division of the first-period sales. As a whole, price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare.

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Price discrimination with partial information: Does it pay off?

Cited by 23 publications

References 6 publications

Targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals

Targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals

Agent based mobile negotiation for personalized pricing of last minute theatre tickets

Pricing with customer recognition

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