Price discrimination and investment incentives

Alexandrov, Alexei; Deb, Joyee

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.07.001

Cited by 17 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…is ensure the concavity of the function U 2 , and we let ∂U 2 ∂S = 0 in Equation (18), which generates the optimal S of the government:…”

Section: Scenario Two: the Implementation Of Bim By The Operator Withmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Researchers have pointed out that price discrimination was an effective means of regulation in the development of many traditional transport systems, and the effect of price discrimination tended to intensify over time [17,18]. Therefore, research regarding dynamic pricing of public transportation attracts researchers attention increasingly [19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bidirectional Incentive Model for Bicycle Redistribution of a Bicycle Sharing System during Rush Hour

Shan

2016

Sustainability

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Abstract:Redistribution is an important part of operational activities in a bicycle sharing system (BSS). This paper proposes that there are two types of users in a BSS: leisure travelers and commuters. The operators and the government are adopting the bidirectional incentive model (BIM) to improve their service level of redistribution. That is, the BIM stimulates leisure travelers to actively respond to bicycle resetting needs of the system; on the other hand, it guides commuters by encouraging them to avoid travelling in peak periods. This is beneficial to achieve the goals of reducing the scheduling pressure on bicycles during rush hour, and even to realize the self-resetting of the BSS. In this paper, we explore three scenarios for implementing BIM through cooperation between the operator and the government. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we illustrate the quantity of users in three different travel behaviors, and surplus value of these users respectively. We also consider the trend of the profit of the operator and the government when some changes of parameters are made. The numerical analysis and case discussion find that the strategy of the operator implementing BIM with a subsidy is the best method for developed regions. In a developing region, the strategy of implementing the BIM with a direct government subsidy to users is the best choice in a small or tourist city. In these cities, the proportion of leisure travelers is always larger than 50%, resulting in a significant incentive effect. The strategy of the operator implementing BIM without a subsidy is the best choice for the large and medium-sized city.

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“…is ensure the concavity of the function U 2 , and we let ∂U 2 ∂S = 0 in Equation (18), which generates the optimal S of the government:…”

Section: Scenario Two: the Implementation Of Bim By The Operator Withmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bidirectional Incentive Model for Bicycle Redistribution of a Bicycle Sharing System during Rush Hour

Shan

2016

Sustainability

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“…When one move from one price tok, this generates an output eect but also a prot eect since monopolist's prot also increases. If the (total) consumers surplus increases (when one move from one price tō k prices), the social welfare will thus increase so that W * (k) > W * (1). Consider now the case in which the monopolist is allowed to charge k prices rather thank, with k >k. In such a case, from proposition 3, the total quantity remains the same so that there is no output eect, i.e., all the social benets of price discrimination have been exhausted.…”

Section: Denition 4 Letmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the welfare effects of regulating the number of discriminatory prices

Braouézec¹

2016

Research in Economics

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“…For instance, Jorge and Pires (2013) take into account the role of price discrimination on industry structure with two geographically different markets and potential entry by a producer of a horizontally differentiated product. A similar result is obtained in Alexandrov and Deb (2012), namely that the increase in the investment in quality when price discrimination is allowed relative to a uniform price may dominate the misallocation effect. The product quality dimension has recently been considered in the analysis of price discrimination, with quality typically being endogenously chosen by competing firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality Differences, Third‐degree Price Discrimination, and Welfare

2016

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We propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences. In each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets. Local firms produce higher-quality goods than the global firm. If the quality levels of the local firms' products are the same, price discrimination is never welfare-decreasing. If they differ, discrimination is welfare-increasing if quantity increases. Because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination, there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination. (JEL D43, D60) 339

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Price discrimination and investment incentives

Cited by 17 publications

References 15 publications

Bidirectional Incentive Model for Bicycle Redistribution of a Bicycle Sharing System during Rush Hour

Bidirectional Incentive Model for Bicycle Redistribution of a Bicycle Sharing System during Rush Hour

On the welfare effects of regulating the number of discriminatory prices

Quality Differences, Third‐degree Price Discrimination, and Welfare

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