Price and Service Competition of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Consumer Returns

Ren, Lili; He, Yong; Song, Houfei

doi:10.1155/2014/565603

Cited by 34 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Qin et al [38] studied the competition and cooperation strategies between two competitive logistics service providers and the online retailer. Ren et al [39] and Dan et al [40] both studied service competition online and traditional channels.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Zhou

Xie

et al. 2020

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members' profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Zhou

Xie

et al. 2020

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, Tsay and Agrawal studied a dynamic model of price and service competition with capacity constraints [19]. In the online and offline channels of supply chain, both Ren et al [20] and Dan et al [21] considered service competition. Zhang et al [22] and Fan and Liu [23] discussed service competition strategy in a two-channel supply chain model.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on Quality Decisions in Supply Chain considering the Lagged Time and Retailers Competition

Peng

Ning

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The lagged time on goodwill is a common phenomenon in the process of quality improvement, which plays an important role in making quality strategy of supply chain. With increasing public attention to quality, supply chain quality management has become a research focus in recent years. This paper probes into the lagged time of quality on goodwill under the competitive environment of retailers and constructs a lagged differential equation of quality on goodwill based on the Nerlove–Arrow model. The results indicate that the optimal goodwill and quality are higher under centralized decision-making than under decentralized decision-making; however, whether or not the profit of the entire supply chain is higher under centralized decision-making depends on the span of the lagged time. Under decentralized decision-making, the lagged time of product quality on goodwill is favorable to retailers but unfavorable to manufacturers and vice versa. Therefore, when competition is low, a supply chain tends to adopt centralized decision-making. When competition is intense, it is appropriate for a supply chain to adopt decentralized decision-making. In conclusion, this paper analyzes the effects of the lagged time on the optimal quality level and supply chain profit as well as the effect of the competition coefficient on research findings concerning supply chain profit under centralized and decentralized decision-making to verify the relevant conclusions of this paper.

show abstract

“…Theorem 9 implies that the decentralized supply chain can be coordinated by the proposed mechanism with appropriate parameters. As a matter of fact, in reality, an acceptable coordination mechanism should guarantee that each player's expected profit is not worse off and at least one player is strictly better off, that is, Pareto improvement [26,27]. In the rest of this section, we will address that the expected profit of the coordinated supply chain under the proposed mechanism can be arbitrarily divided between the supplier and the manufacturer, and thus both the supplier and the manufacturer can benefit from the coordination.…”

Section: Coordination Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordinating a Supply Chain When Manufacturer Makes Cost Reduction Investment in Supplier

Huang

2016

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider a supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream manufacturer, in which the supplier provides a component to the manufacturer, facing a price-sensitive and uncertain demand. The manufacturer makes cost reduction investment in the supplier to improve the supplier’s production efficiency, which benefits the entire supply chain. We derive the optimal investment and operating decisions. Both the centralized and decentralized supply chains are studied. We show that the optimal investment and operating decisions in the decentralized setting may deviate from that in the centralized setting. To avoid the profit loss caused by such a deviation, we develop a coordination mechanism by introducing a combined policy of revenue-sharing policy and investment cost-sharing policy. We also show that the developed coordination mechanism can achieve Pareto improvement for the two players.

show abstract

Price and Service Competition of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Consumer Returns

Cited by 34 publications

References 20 publications

Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Study on Quality Decisions in Supply Chain considering the Lagged Time and Retailers Competition

Coordinating a Supply Chain When Manufacturer Makes Cost Reduction Investment in Supplier

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About