Prevention method of block withholding attack based on miners’ mining behavior in blockchain

Chen, Hao; Chen, Yourong; Xiong, Zhenyu; Han, Meng; He, Zaobo; Liu, Banteng; Wang, Zhangquan; Ma, Zhenghua

doi:10.1007/s10489-022-03889-3

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Answer: Most current research on the game theory of mining pools facing BWH attacks uses static game methods to model two mining pools [36][37][38][39]. There are expected to be very few studies on the dynamic game of the two mining pools because when the two mining pools are modeled, there are only four situations in which the mining pool launches BWH attacks that are easy to model.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fujita et al [38] modeled the pool selection process of miners in the two pools as an evolutionary game and found the Evolutionarily Stable States (ESSs) of the game as the solutions to take full advantage of the profits of the miners. Chen et al [39] proposed a prevention method of block withholding attack (PMBWA) based on miners' mining behavior in a blockchain to prevent the block withholding attack. Kim et al [40] proposed an evolutionary game model and solution based on the miners who confronted BHW attacks in multiple mining pools to choose which mining pool had the best profit.…”

Section: Research Progress and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Method to Mitigate Block Withholding Attack in Blockchain System

et al. 2023

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Consensus algorithms are the essential components of blockchain systems. They guarantee the blockchain’s fault tolerance and security. The Proof of Work (PoW) consensus algorithm is one of the most widely used consensus algorithms in blockchain systems, using computational puzzles to enable mining pools to compete for block rewards. However, this excessive competition for computational power will bring security threats to blockchain systems. A block withholding (BWH) attack is one of the most critical security threats blockchain systems face. A BWH attack obtains the reward of illegal block extraction by replacing full proof with partial mining proof. However, the current research on the BWH game could be more extensive, considering the problem from the perspective of a static game, and it needs an optimal strategy that dynamically reflects the mining pool for multiple games. Therefore, to solve the above problems, this paper uses the method of the evolutionary game to design a time-varying dynamic game model through the degree of system supervision and punishment. Based on establishing the game model, we use the method of replicating dynamic equations to analyze and find the optimal strategy for mining pool profits under different BWH attacks. The experimental results demonstrate that the mining pools will choose honest mining for the best profit over time under severe punishment and high supervision. On the contrary, if the blockchain system is supervised with a low penalty, the mining pools will eventually choose to launch BWH attacks against each other to obtain the optimal mining reward. These experimental results also prove the validity and correctness of our model and solution.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Research Progress and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Method to Mitigate Block Withholding Attack in Blockchain System

et al. 2023

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“…Within such pools, the pool manager concentrates all miners to reach a consensus and distribute the revenue in proportion to each miner’s contribution. Although mining pools provide miners with more stable revenue, there may be consensus attacks on mining pools during the consensus process [ 11 ], such as the Selfish Mining (SM) attack [ 12 ], Block Withholding (BWH) attack [ 13 ], and Fork After Withholding (FAW) attack. Consensus attacks affect the normal transactions of mining pools and provide transaction support for criminal acts such as money laundering, cyber extortion, and so on [ 14 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Novel Data-Driven Evaluation Framework for Fork after Withholding Attack in Blockchain Systems

Zhang

Chen

Miao

et al. 2022

Sensors

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In the blockchain system, mining pools are popular for miners to work collectively and obtain more revenue. Nowadays, there are consensus attacks that threaten the efficiency and security of mining pools. As a new type of consensus attack, the Fork After Withholding (FAW) attack can cause huge economic losses to mining pools. Currently, there are a few evaluation tools for FAW attacks, but it is still difficult to evaluate the FAW attack protection capability of target mining pools. To address the above problem, this paper proposes a novel evaluation framework for FAW attack protection of the target mining pools in blockchain systems. In this framework, we establish the revenue model for mining pools, including honest consensus revenue, block withholding revenue, successful fork revenue, and consensus cost. We also establish the revenue functions of target mining pools and other mining pools, respectively. In particular, we propose an efficient computing power allocation optimization algorithm (CPAOA) for FAW attacks against multiple target mining pools. We propose a model-solving algorithm based on improved Aquila optimization by improving the selection mechanism in different optimization stages, which can increase the convergence speed of the model solution and help find the optimal solution in computing power allocation. Furthermore, to greatly reduce the possibility of falling into local optimal solutions, we propose a solution update mechanism that combines the idea of scout bees in an artificial bee colony optimization algorithm and the constraint of allocating computing power. The experimental results show that the framework can effectively evaluate the revenue of various mining pools. CPAOA can quickly and accurately allocate the computing power of FAW attacks according to the computing power of the target mining pool. Thus, the proposed evaluation framework can effectively help evaluate the FAW attack protection capability of multiple target mining pools and ensure the security of the blockchain system.

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Efficient and Secure Data Storage for Future Networks: Review and Future Opportunities

Saad Alsalim,

Awais Javed

2024

IEEE Access

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Prevention method of block withholding attack based on miners’ mining behavior in blockchain

Cited by 6 publications

References 28 publications

An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Method to Mitigate Block Withholding Attack in Blockchain System

An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Method to Mitigate Block Withholding Attack in Blockchain System

A Novel Data-Driven Evaluation Framework for Fork after Withholding Attack in Blockchain Systems

Efficient and Secure Data Storage for Future Networks: Review and Future Opportunities

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