Preventing proliferation: the impact on international politics

Abstract

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.

Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001

“…Prominent in Harkavy’s (1981:136) definition of “pariahtude” are an inability to match the conventional military power of an opposing state or coalition, “objectively poor diplomatic leverage,” and being in a position where one’s “national origins and legitimacy—or present constitutional status—is widely questioned… that is, its present national status, within its own defined borders, is at issue.” 3 Given such conditions, Harkavy (1981:138) claims that “the not unexpected result may be recourse to an ‘equalizer’—the nuclear equivalent of a pistol for a scrawny man in a menacing neighborhood.” Likewise, Quester (1979:544) notes that nuclear weapons possession can “serve a real purpose” by allowing states “whose very existence is threatened by the possibility of armed attack from its neighbors” to shed their pariah status. Moreover, Quester (1981) indicates that pariah status is not a necessary condition for proliferation; as was the case for the Soviet Union, proliferation might be an attractive option for even diplomatically and conventionally powerful states to “equalize” against nuclear rivals who wish to fundamentally alter aspects of that state’s regime or territorial status.…”

“…Attacks can produce significant collateral damage, which might outrage the international community. Support for preemption is only likely to be solid if the proliferator has not been dissuaded from proliferating by other means and is immediately and directly threatening something of great interest to a potential attacker (Quester 1981). Also, since tactical surprise is difficult to achieve and targeting intelligence difficult to gather, conventional attacks are unlikely to affect total destruction of all materiel, which would subsequently lead to the survival of the program and the redoubling of proliferation efforts on the part of the target (Schneider 1994).…”

Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

“…Nuclear weapons may deter potential adversaries from initiating conflicts or countervail asymmetry in terms of conventional weaponry (Beaton and Maddox 1962;Dunn and Kahn 1976;Potter 1982;Quester 2005;Rosecrance 1964). In addition, pariah nations-states politically isolated by their neighbors or by other countries-are more likely to seek nuclear weapons to demonstrate their viability and power to the international community (Quester 1973;Betts 1977;Rosen 1975). Pariah states may also seek nuclear weapons for deterrence to dissuade adversaries from political or military hostilities.…”

“…Nuclear weapons have been perceived as a symbol of regional or international prominence. States may seek to develop nuclear weapons to represent or enhance their perceived prestige (Beaton and Maddox 1962;Dunn and Kahn 1976;Greenwood, Feiveson, and Taylor 1977;Quester 1977;Wildrich and Taylor 1974).…”

“…For discussions of the use of proliferation as a bargaining chip, see Quester (1981) and Reynolds (1996). 21.…”