Preventing EFail Attacks with Client-Side WebAssembly: The Case of Swiss Post's IncaMail

Abstract

Traditional email encryption schemes are vulnerable to EFail attacks, which exploit the lack of message authentication by manipulating ciphertexts and exfiltrating plaintext via HTML backchannels. Swiss Post's IncaMail, a secure email service for transmitting legally binding, encrypted, and verifiable emails, counters EFail attacks using an authenticatedencryption with associated data (AEAD) encryption scheme to ensure message privacy and authentication between servers. IncaMail relies on a trusted infrastructure backend and encrypts messages per user policy. This paper presents a revised IncaMail architecture that offloads the majority of cryptographic operations to clients, offering benefits such as reduced computational load and energy footprint, relaxed trust assumptions, and per-message encryption key policies. Our proof-of-concept prototype and benchmarks demonstrate the robustness of the proposed scheme, with clientside WebAssembly-based cryptographic operations yielding significant performance improvements (up to ~14×) over conventional JavaScript implementations.