Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence

Abstract

This paper deals with the presumption of innocence and the law enforcer's incentives to exert investigative effort. Our main result is that, even if the presumption of guilt maximizes deterrence for a given effort by the law enforcer, divergent objectives between the law enforcer (who maximizes the probability of a conviction weighted by the magnitude of the sanction and the type of the citizen) and the public decision-maker (who minimizes social costs) may lead the latter to prefer the presumption of innocence. Indeed, the presumption of innocence may induce the law enforcer to increase investigative efforts thereby improving deterrence. As a consequence, if the law enforcer's effort is relatively efficient compared with its cost, and if the external harm from the crime is high enough, considering the law enforcer's effort as an endogenous variable tilts the balance in favor of the presumption of innocence. Therefore, under some conditions, the presumption of innocence does not interfere with deterrence.

Optimal Law Enforcement : Nuance Between Arrest and Punishment

“…until the judicial result is achieved. This idea is consistent with the work of Obidzinski and Oytana (2018). Their article focuses on the link between the principle of presumption of innocence and crime deterrent.…”

“…Furthermore, Obidzinski and Oytana (2018) argue that the standard of proof refers to the degree of certainty required for the court to convict a suspect. They explain that both the standard of proof and the presumption principle are related to the strength of evidence needed to convict: stronger evidence will be needed to secure a conviction if there is a presumption of innocence or a high standard of proof.…”