Prestige-seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-led operations

Abstract

In this article we broaden the conventional understanding of prestige and show that prestige-seeking played a major role in the Danish and Norwegian decisions to provide military support to post-Cold War US-led wars. Both countries made costly military contributions in the hope of increasing their standing and prestige in Washington. Both governments regarded prestige as a form of soft power, which they could later convert into access, influence, and US support. Our findings are far from trivial. They make a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that small powers understand and seek prestige in ways that differ fundamentally from the ways great powers do. They also help to explain why smaller US allies made costly contributions to the Balkan, Afghan, Iraq, and Libyan wars at a time when there was no direct threat to their national security and their security dependence on the United States was low. The high value that small US allies attach to their visibility and prestige in Washington suggests that it is far easier for the United States to obtain military support from smaller allies than Realist studies of burden-sharing and collective action problems would lead us to expect.

Show them the flag: status ambitions and recognition in small state coalition warfare

“…Theoretically, we move away from the fear of abandonment motivation towards more positive status incitements, where an increase in status and reputation does not only count in the eye of the alliance hegemon, but also in the relation to other security dependent small states in the alliance. Empirically, we move beyond the usual Scandinavian suspects that have so far been the centre of attention in the small state literature (Oma and Petersson 2019, but also: Jakobsen and Rynning 2019, Pedersen 2018, Jakobsen et al 2018, Wivel and Crandall 2019. By analysing the case of Belgium's participation in the international coalition against ISIL, we intend to broaden the explanatory scope of the "bandwagon for status" hypothesis.…”

“…Drawing on recent trends in neo-classical realism (Jakobsen et al 2018, Jakobsen and Rynning 2019, Wivel and Crandall 2019 and constructivist alliance literature (Graeger 2015), we argue that it can be purposeful to adopt a broader understanding of the utilitarian motives behind small state alliance behaviour. In this way, some of the empirical and theoretical shortcomings which the modified threat hypothesis has encountered can be modified.…”

“…There has recently been increased interest in, and empirical proof of status motivations in a number of (similar) Scandinavian cases (Graeger 2015, Pedersen 2018, Jakobsen et al 2018, Crandall and Varov 2016, Wivel and Crandall 2019, Oma and Petersson 2019, Jakobsen and Rynning 2019). Yet, while these studies offer support for the bandwagon for status hypothesis, their analyses have not yet shown how such motives actually guide small states military activism (see however Jakobsen et al 2018). Neither has it so far been shown whether and how small states are able to translate such prestige into an improved status position, nor has the hypothesis been tested outside the usual Scandinavian suspects.…”

“…Status-seeking motives have been conceptualised in different ways (see Jakobsen et al (2018), Pedersen (2018;, Oma and Petersson (2019) for recent examples). What connects these authors is that they mainly identified statements that suggested a presence of status motivations in their considerations to contribute to US-or NATO-led operations.…”

“…This status-seeking hypothesis has over the past years gradually gained foothold, with several authors having cautiously recognised, and found empirical proof for the presence and relevance of such positive status motives in the security strategies and motivations of the small Scandinavian states (Pedersen 2018, Jakobsen et al 2018, Crandall and Varov 2016, Graeger 2015. So far, however, it has hardly been explained how such positive motives actually guide and potentially shape small states' military contributions in USor NATO-led operations.…”