Préstamos a riesgo de mar y redes transatlánticas en el comercio entre Cádiz y la costa del Pacífico sudamericano, 1760-1825

Lamikiz, Xabier

doi:10.18232/20073496.1367

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

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The Sharing of the Profits of theCarrera de Indias: The Actors of the Hispanic Colonial Trade and Their Monopolistic Practices in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century

Bartolomei

2024

The Americas

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The Carrera de Indias, considered as a set of circuits connecting Hispanic America to world markets, does not appear as a “monopoly” reserved solely for the Spanish merchants of Cadiz, but rather as a complex commercial system, structured into three autonomous segments, each of them dominated by a mercantile corporation, more or less formalized. In the central part, which linked the two shores of the Atlantic, the merchants registered in the Consulado of the Indies of Cadiz (cargadores) obviously dominated the market. However, these were in turn dominated by the merchants from the consulates of Mexico and Lima in the inland trade (comercio de tierra adentro), which linked the great American ports and fairs with the markets of the interior of the continent, and by the foreign merchants of Cadiz, structured into “nations,” in the exchanges that linked the Andalusian port with the rest of Europe and the world. Thus, the beneficiaries of the Spanish colonial trade in the second half of the eighteenth century were neither only cargadores, nor foreign “smugglers” enjoying the weakness of the Spanish empire as the historiography of the Carrera de Indias has traditionally postulated, but those three groups of traders. After highlighting this singular structure of colonial trade in the Spanish Atlantic, we will consider the different institutional and relational factors that could explain it. Obviously, it is because the different groups of actors involved in these exchanges had a specific social, relational, cultural, and institutional capital that they had a comparative advantage over their rivals in certain segments of the Carrera de Indias circuits, and that they were able to obtain the dominant position that we observe.

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The Sharing of the Profits of theCarrera de Indias: The Actors of the Hispanic Colonial Trade and Their Monopolistic Practices in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century

Bartolomei

2024

The Americas

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Respondentia: The alternative contract for global trade finance in the Early Modern period

Irigoin

2024

Datini Studies in Economic History

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By specifying the specie on which returns were to be repaid respondentia was an efficient instrument to carry trade in which silver was «essential» for the continuation of commerce. As silver was imported as specie, where a multiplicity of means of payments existed and silver was the preferred money, it performed as foreign currency. Without common standards for foreign coins created issues for trade, the pricing of specie, and exchange rates. Eighteenth century Europeans alternatively used respondentia or bills depending on the monetary context, casting a doubt on the inherent efficiency of a cashless means of payment. Bills of exchange did not circulate outside Europe where cash had a premium. As the intermediary Europe developed means to regulate the price of foreign coins and exchange rates. Elsewhere respondentia had an advantage over bills; it allowed to hedge against uncertainty and propitiated arbitrage profits.

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Negociar el cargo, pactar la corrupción. La designación del príncipe de Santo Buono como virrey del Perú y sus mercadeos previos

Andújar Castillo

2024

Rev. Complut. Hist. Am.

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En un contexto político marcado por la generalizada corrupción de quienes habían servido y servían como virreyes en América, en el año 1709, a iniciativa del embajador francés Michel Amelot, se planteó un cambio en la política de nombramiento de los nuevos virreyes del Perú y Nueva España. Ese cambio consistía en permitirles ganancias adicionales a sus salarios con el fin de que atenuasen las prácticas corruptas que se habían generalizado y que repercutían directamente sobre la hacienda del rey. Se estudia el caso del nombramiento del duque de Linares como virrey de Nueva España y, de forma más específica, del príncipe de Santo Buono como virrey del Perú. A partir del estudio de la correspondencia privada de este último, y del cruce con fuentes estatales, se muestra cómo, además de obtener esas ganancias adicionales, consiguió licencia para navegar un navío en el que cargaría mercancías, de modo que sus actividades ilícitas, con permiso del rey, las inició antes de llegar a Lima. En la ciudad de Cádiz, el noble napolitano pidió en el año de 1715 préstamos por valor de cerca de 300.000 pesos, que devolvería meses después en Portobelo, una vez vendidas las mercancías que portaba. Paralelamente, tanto por medio de esos créditos como durante la larga travesía, comenzó a articular una red de relaciones que sería fundamental para sus años de gobierno

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Préstamos a riesgo de mar y redes transatlánticas en el comercio entre Cádiz y la costa del Pacífico sudamericano, 1760-1825

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

The Sharing of the Profits of theCarrera de Indias: The Actors of the Hispanic Colonial Trade and Their Monopolistic Practices in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century

The Sharing of the Profits of theCarrera de Indias: The Actors of the Hispanic Colonial Trade and Their Monopolistic Practices in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century

Respondentia: The alternative contract for global trade finance in the Early Modern period

Negociar el cargo, pactar la corrupción. La designación del príncipe de Santo Buono como virrey del Perú y sus mercadeos previos

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