Abstract:Corporate illegality researchers often maintain that wrongdoing occurs when factors pressure a firm to behave illegally, leading managers to make a rational decision to commit wrongdoing. Yet, corporate illegality results also from conditions of opportunity and predisposition, and it may be an unintended outcome of corporate actions. A multivariate model of corporate illegality is proposed, in which situational factors-conditions of pressure, opportunity, or predisposition-lead to unintentional and intentional… Show more
“…Along these lines, Alexander and Cohen (1996) found that firms with poor performance were more likely to commit environmental crimes. Research on corporate corruption also supports the idea that poor performance is often an antecedent to corrupt behaviors (Baucus, 1994). However, the impact of performance is likely to depend on the stock-based incentive situation.…”
Section: Contingency Of Stock-based Incentivesmentioning
Synthesizing agency theory and prospect theory, we examined the effects of stockbased incentives on CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. In analyses of data compiled from the public companies listed in Compustat's Executive Compensation Database and a U.S. General Accounting Office restatements database, we found that CEOs were more likely to manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money options and lower stock ownership. Firm performance and CEO tenure interacted with out-of-the-money options and ownership to influence CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. Our findings inform agency-based views by providing evidence that, under certain conditions, stock-based managerial incentives lead to incentive misalignment.We are grateful to Amy Hillman and three anonymous reviewers, all of whom offered exceptionally insightful suggestions. We also appreciate the helpful advice of Cathy C. Durham, Paul J. Hanges, and Charles LaHaie. Finally, we thank the individuals at the U.S. General Accounting Office, the Huron Consulting Group, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission who were very generous with their assistance.
“…Along these lines, Alexander and Cohen (1996) found that firms with poor performance were more likely to commit environmental crimes. Research on corporate corruption also supports the idea that poor performance is often an antecedent to corrupt behaviors (Baucus, 1994). However, the impact of performance is likely to depend on the stock-based incentive situation.…”
Section: Contingency Of Stock-based Incentivesmentioning
Synthesizing agency theory and prospect theory, we examined the effects of stockbased incentives on CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. In analyses of data compiled from the public companies listed in Compustat's Executive Compensation Database and a U.S. General Accounting Office restatements database, we found that CEOs were more likely to manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money options and lower stock ownership. Firm performance and CEO tenure interacted with out-of-the-money options and ownership to influence CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. Our findings inform agency-based views by providing evidence that, under certain conditions, stock-based managerial incentives lead to incentive misalignment.We are grateful to Amy Hillman and three anonymous reviewers, all of whom offered exceptionally insightful suggestions. We also appreciate the helpful advice of Cathy C. Durham, Paul J. Hanges, and Charles LaHaie. Finally, we thank the individuals at the U.S. General Accounting Office, the Huron Consulting Group, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission who were very generous with their assistance.
Prior research on corporate misconduct pays extensive attention to single misconduct behaviors. However, little research has addressed recidivism -the repeated behaviors of corporate misconduct. Based on institutional theory and using the context of emerging economies where recidivism plays a considerable role, we propose the path dependency of corporate recidivism and suggest that three influential factors exist: internal preconditioning, inter-organizational imitation, and the prevailing external evaluation. Our event history analysis of 1,036 listed companies in China over the period 2001-2008 statistically confirms our hypotheses. We conclude the paper by outlining the implications for both theory and practice.
“…Though investigators in this domain have traditionally grouped crimes committed against organizations together with crimes committed for them (Sutherland, 1940), scholars have more recently been careful to distinguish between the two (Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008). Additionally, some organizational crime experts (e.g, Baucus, 1994) dichotomize acts committed for organizations according to intentionality. While some organizationally beneficial legal violations are accidental and without awareness (e.g., failing to comply out of ignorance), others are deliberate (e.g., intentionally dumping bilge waste to save money).…”
Section: Workplace Deviance As Dcbmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the wake of regular and explicit media coverage of incidents like the ones described above, scholars have proposed several related but distinct constructs that account for pro-organizational behaviour that harms stakeholders in unreasonable and unnecessary ways. These theoretical frameworks, however, tend to only address a subset of this type of problematic behaviour (e.g., violations of law; Baucus, 1994) or account for its causes and consequences only at one level of analysis (e.g., at the individual level of analysis; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). Consequently, we lack a cohesive, integrated, multi-level model for this class of problematic pro-organizational behaviours and their multi-level antecedents and consequences.…”
There is regular and explicit media coverage of employee behaviour intended to advance organizational goals, but that harms stakeholder interests in ways that exceed necessity and reason. Although several constructs such as workplace deviance, organizational misbehaviour, corporate crime and corruption, and unethical pro-organizational behaviour have been advanced to account for this type of behaviour, no comprehensive framework exists that also includes the full scope of its important consequences. Accordingly, we propose the umbrella construct of detrimental citizenship behaviour (DCB) that allows us to integrate and build upon previous related conceptualizations that have developed mostly in parallel bodies of research. We rely on ethical decision-making, creativity, and instrumental stakeholder theories to embed the umbrella DCB construct within a multi-level and longitudinal model. The DCB model includes processes through which such behaviour and its consequences unfold over time for organizational members, organizations, and society at large. The proposed framework describes, explains, and predicts DCB and also leads to suggestions for future research. In addition, we offer suggestions regarding how to manage this highly consequential type of organizational behaviour, thereby engaging in a much-needed science-practice dialogue in management and organization studies.
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