Presidents and Patronage

Abstract

To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This paper presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non-policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama Administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non-policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.Keywords: president, appointment, patronage, agency, appointee 1 Presidents and PatronageThe proper means of filling appointed government positions has been controversial since before the drafting of the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton argued that "the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce good administration" and lauded the Constitution's appointment process. 2 According to Hamilton, presidents would "investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled" and thereby increase the chances that offices would be filled persons of ability. 3 Hamilton's defense of the Article II appointment powers rested upon the belief that presidential appointment would lead to the selection of persons on the basis of merit rather than personal connections, "private and party likings and dislikes…", or unseemly political exchange. 4 The long history of presidential appointments in the United States challenges Hamilton's optimism, at least for some positions and agencies (See e.g., Fish 1904; Friedrich 1937;Kaufman 1965;Skowronek 1982;Van Riper 1958;White 1948White , 1954Wilson 1887). Starting with George Washington, but accelerating notably under Andrew Jackson and his successors, presidents have named persons to administration jobs at least partly in exchange for electoral or political support.Reformers hoped to curb the excesses of the spoils-based personnel system with the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883; however, actual results fell short of their aspirations. 5 Indeed, despite 2 Rossiter, ed. 1961. Federalist 68, 414. Hamilton particularly lauded the Constitution's mode of selection relative to other possible modes such as legislative selection.3 Rossiter, ed. 1961. Federalist 76, 456. 4 Ibid. 5 22 Stat. 403 (1883). For accounts of the enactment of the act see Johnson and Libecap 1994, ch. 2; Skowronek 1982, ch. 3; Theriault 2003. 2 Presidents and Patronage the enactment of the Pendleton Act and subsequent reforms, tho...

The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments

“…Previous studies of executive appointments (e.g., Hollibaugh 2015aHollibaugh , 2015bHollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014;Lewis 2007;Lewis 2008;Parsneau 2008) have argued that when making executive appointments, presidents are forced to make trade-offs between policy goals and political goals, a line of thought that extends at least as far back as Wilson's (1887) theory of the politics-administration dichotomy. Indeed, while patronage appointments "provide a means for presidents to hold supporters in line : : : and accomplish their policy goals" (Lewis 2008, 208), agencies run by appointees with connections to the president's party or campaign (i.e., those most likely to have been patronage appointees) tend to perform worse than agencies run by other types of appointees, suggesting patronage is one possible method by which bureaucratic incompetence arises (Gallo and Lewis 2012;Hollibaugh 2015b;Lewis 2007).…”

“…While there exists little research on the determinants of nonprofessional ambassadors per se (but see Fedderke and Jett 2015; also see Flynn 2014 for a discussion of the importance of domestic factors with respect to appointments to the foreign policy bureaucracy more generally), there exists a rather large body of research on the qualifications and backgrounds of executive agency appointees (e.g., Cohen 1998;Edwards 2001;Heclo 1977;Hollibaugh 2015aHollibaugh , 2015bHollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014;Krause and O'Connell 2015;Lewis 2008Lewis , 2009). Previous research on agency appointments has with-ambassador-posts.html (accessed April 18, 2015); Jonathan Weisman and Yuka Hayashi, "Donors Find a Home in Obama's Ambassador Corps," Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB124658149328689699.html (accessed April 18, 2015).…”

“…White areas represent areas for which no data are available. suggested nonprofessional appointments are most likely when an agency is not a particularly high priority to the president, when an agency's mission is ideologically aligned with the policies of the president, when individual appointments have little influence on agency outcomes, and when the benefits of agency expertise are particularly low (Hollibaugh 2015b;Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014;Lewis 2008Lewis , 2009. That said, because of their prominence, international character, and frequent use for patronage purposes, it is unknown whether ambassadorial appointments are governed by the same dynamics.…”

Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

“…In the relationship between political and administrative spheres of the state, a balance must be struck between control and stimulus, but they must also be appreciably separate in order to allow for effective oversight and corrective action . This tradeoff accounts for the vast across-state and within-state variation in the degree to which political institutions control administrative institutions (Peters and Pierre, 2004;Hollibaugh et al, 2014).…”

“…Employment granted only in exchange for political support, that is, patronage, is, on the other hand, more retrospective, and may be characterized by transferability (easily withdrawn and reassigned). Such positions are more likely to be low-skilled and therefore transferrable to a broader set of potential voters or party loyalists (Hicken, 2011), or concentrated in agencies in policy sectors of lower political priority (Hollibaugh et al, 2014).…”