2018
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3125228
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Presidential Power and Shareholder Wealth

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Consider, for example, the Fukushima earthquake in 2011, which damaged a nearby nuclear power plant and Knight [2006] for an analysis of the impact of the 2000 U.S. presidential election on stock prices. For event studies focused on the 2016 election, see Wagner et al [2018a] and Massound and Zhou [2018].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consider, for example, the Fukushima earthquake in 2011, which damaged a nearby nuclear power plant and Knight [2006] for an analysis of the impact of the 2000 U.S. presidential election on stock prices. For event studies focused on the 2016 election, see Wagner et al [2018a] and Massound and Zhou [2018].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To the extent that such political influence may be employed to exploit revenue growth opportunities (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004) or influence policymaking and regulation (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), the effect of political connections should be positive for shareholders. Many empirical studies corroborate the existence of a positive effect on shareholder value from the appointment of a politically connected individual in the USA (Acemoglu et al, 2016;Child et al, 2020;Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2009;Luechinger and Moser, 2014). Overall, we expect the resignations from the advisory councils to have triggered a negative response from shareholders only partially mitigated by any potentially positive effects of the advocacy itself: H1: Shareholders react negatively to CEOs' resignation from presidential councils both in absolute and relative terms compared to firms whose CEOs remain on the councils.…”
Section: Ceo Activism and Firm Valuementioning
confidence: 64%