Presidential Administration

Kagan, Elena

doi:10.2307/1342513

Cited by 297 publications

(209 citation statements)

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“…Finally, several scholars have argued that a fragmented legislative process may make it difficult for the legislature to constrain or resist unilateral action by the executive branch, which can give rise to the paradoxical result that greater formal separation of legislative powers may lead to greater de facto concentration of lawmaking power in the executive (Hammond and Knott 1996;Kagan 2001;Moe and Howell 1999). While this hypothesis may have ramifications similar to those generated by the model developed in this paper, the underlying mechanism is quite different.…”

mentioning

confidence: 60%

“…12 This is not to say that real-world legislators will ever ignore completely the electoral consequences of their actions, even when the electoral impact of any given decision may seem marginal (Arnold 1990;Kagan 2001). Rather, the point is that for many issues, the short-term electoral consequences will be sufficiently small, relative to policy considerations, that the assumption that reelection probabilities are exogenous does not entail too great a loss of descriptive realism.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?

Stephenson¹

2013

The Journal of Legal Studies

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It is often asserted that separation of legislative powers tends to make legislation both more moderate (because concessions to all veto players are needed to secure enactment) and less frequent (because sufficient concessions are sometimes infeasible). The formal analysis in this paper shows this claim to be incomplete, and sometimes incorrect. Although greater separation of powers makes legislation more difficult to enact, it also makes legislation, once enacted, more difficult to repeal. Attenuating the threat of repeal means that when one faction has sufficient power to push through extreme policies, it is more likely to do so than would be the case if legislative power were more concentrated. These two effects cut in opposite directions, and it is difficult to say, as a general matter, which will predominate. Indeed, increasing the fragmentation of legislative power may sometimes increase both the expected frequency and the expected extremism of legislative enactments. * I am grateful to

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confidence: 60%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?

Stephenson¹

2013

The Journal of Legal Studies

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“…Over time, however, presidents have tried to assert more direct control over this process, with Richard Nixon making some preliminary efforts along these lines tied to his price and wage control campaign in the early 1970s. Ronald Reagan used the recently created Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB to institutionalize regular cost/benefit analysis for agency regulatory programs, a system that has remained in place in varying forms ever since (Kagan 2001(Kagan , pp. 2277(Kagan -2281Kerwin and Furlong 2010).…”

Section: Regulation or Emendation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Partisan polarization has made achieving legislative action more difficult, and what Elena Kagan (2001) called asserting "directive authority" over the bureaucracy more appealing. As a result, presidents have both enhanced opportunity and motive to utilize administrative strategies seeking to "control" the bureaucracy and shape policy implementation.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Letter of the Law: Administrative Discretion and Obama’s Domestic Unilateralism

Rudalevige

2014

The Forum

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Abstract:In his 2014 State of the Union address Barack Obama pledged to act without Congress on a variety of fronts, following up his "we can't wait" campaign of unilateralism before the 2012 election. The partisan furor this engendered tended to obscure the longstanding efforts of presidents to "faithfully execute" the law in a manner that aligns with their policy preferences. This paper examines the broad logic of those efforts, and delineates five areas where the Obama administration has been particularly aggressive: in its (1) recess appointments; (2) refusal to defend federal law (notably, the Defense of Marriage Act) in court; (3) use of prosecutorial discretion in declining to pursue violations of immigration and drug laws; (4) use of waivers; and (5) its utilization of the regulatory process to interpret the meaning of statutes, as with the Clean Air Act and the Affordable Care Act. Presidents do have flexibility in many cases; but this ends where they seek to alter the plain "letter of the law."

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“…Clearance criteria and procedures are "managerial rules that constrain agency behavior" (Moe, 1993: p. 371) by blocking cabinet departments and other agencies from independently advancing their own agendas in collaboration with congressional committees, and by imposing a political line upon executive units. Thus clearance power enables presidents to maintain administrative, policy and political consistency within their own branch: clearance criteria allow the presidential center to control the policy and political content of executive output, and clearance procedures centralize the information flow and decision-making processes in order to secure content control (Moe and Wilson, 1994;Kagan, 2001). …”

Section: Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Presidency and the Executive Branch in Latin America: What We Know and What We Need to Know

Bonvecchi

Scartascini

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in 1 Abstract *The presidential politics literature depicts presidents either as all-powerful actors or figureheads and seeks to explain outcomes accordingly. The president and the executive branch are nonetheless usually treated as black boxes, particularly in developing countries, even though the presidency has evolved into an extremely complex branch of government.

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Presidential Administration

Cited by 297 publications

References 0 publications

Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?

Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?

The Letter of the Law: Administrative Discretion and Obama’s Domestic Unilateralism

The Presidency and the Executive Branch in Latin America: What We Know and What We Need to Know

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