Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being

Bruckner, Donald W.

doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.632016

Cited by 20 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The Comparison Argument exemplifies a familiar strategy: to argue against a view according to which the A-facts supervene on the B-facts, produce a case in which there is intuitively a difference 27 Others speak instead of intrinsic goodness or badness, but this creates the misleading implication that it is analytic that how basically good a particular thing is supervenes on its intrinsic features. 28 This is compatible with the controversial view, endorsed by Bruckner (2013) and Dorsey (2013), that if you have a future-oriented desire whose object obtains in the future, that object can be basically good for you now. For even though the time at which the object obtains is in the future, the time at which it is basically good is now.…”

Section: Comparison Intuition Is Incompatible With Hedonism Call Thimentioning

confidence: 77%

How to Use the Experience Machine

Lin¹

2015

Utilitas

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a particular way of using the experience machine to argue against hedonism – one that appeals directly to intuitions about the welfare values of experientially identical lives rather than to claims about what we value or claims about whether we would, or should, plug into the machine. The two issues are connected: the conviction that the experience machine leaves hedonism unscathed is partly due to neglect of the best way to use the experience machine.

show abstract

Section: Comparison Intuition Is Incompatible With Hedonism Call Thimentioning

confidence: 77%

How to Use the Experience Machine

Lin¹

2015

Utilitas

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…(Broome [2004, 101]; [Bradley 2009, 18–27]). Bruckner (2013) and Dorsey (2013) reject it. Bradley (2009, 19) argues that Internalism follows from a Moorean view of intrinsic value.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…19. Bruckner (2013) also adopts this view for future-directed desires. Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter (1990) assume this view.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Desire satisfaction, death, and time

Purves

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.

show abstract

“…But surely this can't be. 9 Another brick in the intuitive wall: I, 10 and others, 11 have argued that it is possible to grant individual welfare goods to one's past selves. Put another way: I can now make it the case that I maintained a higher level of welfare yesterday.…”

Section: Why Be Future-biased?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Future‐Bias: A (Qualified) Defense

Dorsey

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The preferences of ordinary folks typically display a future‐bias. For instance, we care more about pains and pleasures in our future than pains and pleasures in our past. Indeed, this future‐bias is so pervasive, many have taken it for granted that the preferences of rational agents will, or at least can, display this future‐bias to some degree or other. However, the rationality of future‐biased preferences has recently come in for critique. However, in this article, I offer a defense of future‐biased preferences against three recent attempts – offered by David Brink, Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan, and Tom Dougherty – to show such preferences irrational.

show abstract

Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being

Cited by 20 publications

References 16 publications

How to Use the Experience Machine

How to Use the Experience Machine

Desire satisfaction, death, and time

Future‐Bias: A (Qualified) Defense

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About