Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification

Abstract

Burnup calculations are applied to determine the amount of krypton-85 that is produced during the irradiation of nuclear fuel. Since krypton-85 is most likely released into the atmosphere during reprocessing to separate plutonium, atmospheric transport modeling is used to calculate the worldwide distribution of krypton-85 concentrations stemming from emissions from declared reprocessing plants. The results are the basis for scenarios in which emissions from clandestine reprocessing facilities have to be detected against various background levels. It is concluded that today's background imposes heavily on the ability to detect small and medium plutonium separation rates; only high separation rates of 1 SQ per week and higher have a chance to be detected with feasible outlay. A fixed network of monitoring stations seems too costly; instead the high number of samples that are required rather calls for mobile sampling procedures, where air samples are collected at random locations over the world and are analyzed in regional laboratories for their krypton-85 concentration. Further, it is argued that krypton-85 emissions from declared reprocessing activities have to be significantly lowered to enable a worldwide verification of the absence of even smaller clandestine reprocessing. For each scenario the number of samples that have to be taken for probable detection is calculated.

Modelling 85Kr datasets with python for applications in tracer hydrology and to investigate atmospheric circulation

“…Over the past 60 years, the origin of 85 Kr in the atmosphere can be considered purely anthropogenic, as its main source are nuclear reprocessing plants. The activity and location of nuclear reprocessing plants varied strongly over this time period, resulting in large temporal and regional changes of atmospheric 85 Kr concentrations [4] . These trends and fluctuations are clearly detectable in the 85 Kr datasets at the monitoring stations, which form the basis of the modelling tool that is presented here.…”

Bio-inspired photonic and plasmonic systems for gas sensing: applications, fabrication, and analytical methods

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