Purpose
Indirect knowledge leakage to rivals located near alliance partners represents a significant risk that has received limited scholarly attention. Hence, the question of how to manage this risk – which the authors term “partner-rival co-location risk” – in nonequity alliances remains unanswered, and this study aims to suggest establishing a steering committee to oversee the partnership.
Design/methodology/approach
Drawing on the agglomeration economies and alliance governance literatures, the authors develop a set of hypotheses and perform a series of empirical tests on 470 nonequity alliances in the US biopharmaceutical industry.
Findings
The authors propose that there is a positive linkage between partner-rival co-location risk and the formation of a steering committee in a nonequity alliance, which receives strong empirical support. Further, this relationship is significantly moderated by the breadth (alliance scope) but not the depth (reciprocal interdependence) of interaction between the partnering firms.
Originality/value
This paper is a pioneer to shed light on “partner-rival co-location risk” and how partner-rival co-location risk affects the governance decision of whether to establish a steering committee in a nonequity alliance, thus offering important theoretical and practical insights into competition and cooperation in alliance management.