Preliminary Exploration of the Use of a Warfare Simulation Model to Examine the Military Value of Training

Abstract

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Further Exploration in Estimating the Military Value of Training

“…At any rate, the samples are too small to suggest more than the general order of magnitude of the change in the two cases. Figure 10 reproduces the results of IDA Paper P-2094 (Deitchman, 1988) that show the impact of improvement in armored force performance on the outcome of the war played in the TACWAR modeL It can be seen that an improvement of 20-35 percent would _ have little impact on the ultimate result. To achieve the necessary factor of 2 or more improvement in armor capability, one would have to shift from the M-60 series to the M-1 series of tanks; other analytic studies show that much improvement or more in moving from the older to the newer tank (a quantitative experimental comparison of unit * •performance with the two tanks on terms comparable with those in this review has not yet been found, and may not exist).…”

“…The results of this analysis show that training yields quantifiable improvements in performance, in the areas of warfare examined. The magnitude is sizeable, especially in the case of tactical bombing, but does not appear to offer a decisive change in the military balance as the latter was assessed in the earlier work (Deitchman, 1988).…”

“…The issue is not whether, as was stated in Deitchman (1988), funds at the margin shculd be put into improvement in training or equipment. Both contribute to force improvemuent, and both are needed.…”

“…(Deitchman, 1988) used a warfare simulation model to examine what would happen to the outcome of a war if unit training could lead to various assumed increases in the capability of armored ground forces and 0 tactical air attack forces to destroy the enemy and to survive themselves. It was found that factors-of-two improvements in parameters considered relevant to training could reverse the course of a war in Central Europe, as portrayed by the model.…”

“…Although the opinions of * • experienced commanders could he sought (as was recommended in Deitchman, 1988), such data would be qualitative rathe d=n quantitative. Qualitative inputs will, in the long run, be necessary to confirm the "reasonableness" of quantitative data gathered under other than real battle conditions, but it would be analytically more appealing to have a solid _ •quantitative base from which such qualitative judgments could start.…”