Preformation and pre-existence in the seventeenth century: A brief analysis

Bowler, Peter J.

doi:10.1007/bf00138311

Cited by 72 publications

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“…We have already seen that Aristotle himself did not think that it was possible to separate the mechanics of development from its teleological purpose. The matter is of some interest because of the extended argument that subsequently took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries about preformation, a debate that also incorporated ideas about free will and predestination [46]. Simply stated, 'preformation' is the idea that the morphogenetic process requires some form of pre-existing template to impose form on the material undergoing development.…”

Section: Harvey: Epigenesis Versus Metamorphosismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooking up the perfect insect: Aristotle's transformational idea about the complete metamorphosis of insects

Reynolds

2019

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Aristotle made important contributions to the study of developmental biology, including the complete metamorphosis of insects. One concept in particular, that of the perfect or complete state, underlies Aristotle's ideas about metamorphosis, the necessity of fertilization for embryonic development, and whether morphogenesis involves an autonomous process of self-assembly. Importantly, the philosopher erroneously views metamorphosis as a necessary developmental response to lack of previous fertilization of the female parent, a view that is intimately connected with his readiness to accept the idea of the spontaneous generation of life. Aristotle's work underpins that of the major seventeenth century students of metamorphosis, Harvey, Redi, Malpighi and Swammerdam, all of whom make frequent reference to Aristotle in their writings. Although both Aristotle and Harvey are often credited with inspiring the later prolonged debate between proponents of epigenesis and preformation, neither actually held firm views on the subject. Aristotle's idea of the perfect stage also underlies his proposal that the eggs of holometabolous insects hatch ‘before their time’, an idea that is the direct precursor of the much later proposals by Lubbock and Berlese that the larval stages of holometabolous insects are due to the ‘premature hatching’ from the egg of an imperfect embryonic stage. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The evolution of complete metamorphosis’.

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Section: Harvey: Epigenesis Versus Metamorphosismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead, he simply opposes epigenesis to metamorphosis. It has been suggested [46] that for Harvey there is a difference between metamorphosis and preformation, in the sense that he meant the term metamorphosis to apply only to non-sanguineous animals (i.e. mostly insects).…”

Section: Harvey: Epigenesis Versus Metamorphosismentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooking up the perfect insect: Aristotle's transformational idea about the complete metamorphosis of insects

Reynolds

2019

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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“…51 On the rise of descriptive embryology and the role of Wolff see Roe 1980;Dupont 2007. 52 On these questions, their context, and the preformationism debate throughout the century, see Roger (1963), Roe (1980), Reill (1998Reill ( , 1999, Bowler (1971). On Kant's position see Sloan (2002); Ingensiep (1990); for a contrasted account of Kant's epigeneticism, Zammito (2003) vs. Huneman (2007).…”

Section: Leibniz Kant and Generation: Some Prospective Insightsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Kant vs. Leibniz in the Second Antinomy: Organisms Are Not Infinitely Subtle Machines

Huneman

2014

Kant-Studien

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This paper interprets the two pages devoted in the Critique of Pure Reason to a critique of Leibniz's view of organisms as infinitely organized machines. It argues that this issue of organisms represents a crucial test-case for Kant in regard to the conflicting notions of space, continuity and divisibility held by classical metaphysics and by criticism. I first present Leibniz's doctrine and its justification. In a second step, I explain the general reasoning by which Kant defines the problem of the Antinomies, and then I specify the case of the Second Antinomy. Then, I ask why the organism raises specific issues for Kant's solution of the Second Antinomy, and why it sheds light on the nature of Leibniz's metaphysical assumptions about organisms. The last section considers this critique of Leibniz from the perspective of Kant's future theory of organisms in the third Critique, specifying its role in the development of a Kantian view of organisms with regard to the changes occurring at the same time in the life sciences.

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“…Yet Gassendi's view does not quite t this description. The argument for taking him to subscribe to a strong preformationism (Roger [1963], Bowler [1971], and Duchesneau [1998]) is centered on Gassendi's proposal that the new organism's soul-which directs the development of the seminal material from both parent organisms-itself comes from the parent organisms. 30 The notion is that a generation theory is preformationist if it entails that the organizing principle for the new individual exists intact in the parent organism prior to formation of the embryo.…”

Section: Animal Gener Ation and The Mecha Nist Account Of Inherimentioning

confidence: 99%

Gassendi's Atomist Account of Generation and Heredity in Plants and Animals

Fisher

2003

Perspectives on Science

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In his accounts of plant and animal generation Pierre Gassendi offers a mechanist story of how organisms create offspring to whom they pass on their traits. Development of the new organism is directed by a material "soul" or animula bearing ontogenetic information. Where reproduction is sexual, two sets of material semina and corresponding animulae meet and jointly determine the division, differentiation, and development of matter in the new organism. The determination of inherited traits requires a means of combining or choosing among each parent's contributions, and towards this end, Gassendi outlines the nature of competition and dominance among animulae. Unlike his fellow mechanists, Gassendi can extend his mechanism to his heredity account, because his proposed vehicle for ontogenetic transmission is material. That proposal in turn relies on his atomist hypothesis. The relative uniformity of atoms allows animulae to operate equivalently across different modes of generation, spontaneous or otherwise. Further, his molecular model of atomic structures allows a material means of storing ontogenetic information received from the souls of parent organisms. These accounts-awed and sketchy-unsurprisingly fail to specify how hereditary information might be borne physically, and in any case do not meet Gassendi's own empiricist standards. Yet this generation theory with pretensions to a materialist mechanism establishes Gassendi's rm commitment to a unity of the sciences through an atomist ontology that underlies all physical phenomena, including the organic.

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Preformation and pre-existence in the seventeenth century: A brief analysis

Cited by 72 publications

References 0 publications

Cooking up the perfect insect: Aristotle's transformational idea about the complete metamorphosis of insects

Cooking up the perfect insect: Aristotle's transformational idea about the complete metamorphosis of insects

Kant vs. Leibniz in the Second Antinomy: Organisms Are Not Infinitely Subtle Machines

Gassendi's Atomist Account of Generation and Heredity in Plants and Animals

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