2017
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-017-0936-z
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Preferences, reasoning errors, and resource egalitarianism

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Conversely, a fact about which the model makes no assumptions might be significant for the outputs, since taking it into account might prove to change the normative principles generated or increase/decrease its desirability or feasibility. Dworkin (1981) makes no explicit assumption about the computational capacities of individuals when defending resource egalitarianism, but if we are to take into account the empirically plausible idea that they can make various types of reasoning errors, his ideal principle of justice faces a feasibility problem and his non-ideal principle of justice faces a desirability problem, as shown by Volacu (2017b). This would therefore be an abstraction in the first sense, but an idealisation in the second sense.…”
Section: On the Ideal/non-ideal Theory Distinction: A Two-dimensionalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conversely, a fact about which the model makes no assumptions might be significant for the outputs, since taking it into account might prove to change the normative principles generated or increase/decrease its desirability or feasibility. Dworkin (1981) makes no explicit assumption about the computational capacities of individuals when defending resource egalitarianism, but if we are to take into account the empirically plausible idea that they can make various types of reasoning errors, his ideal principle of justice faces a feasibility problem and his non-ideal principle of justice faces a desirability problem, as shown by Volacu (2017b). This would therefore be an abstraction in the first sense, but an idealisation in the second sense.…”
Section: On the Ideal/non-ideal Theory Distinction: A Two-dimensionalmentioning
confidence: 99%