Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental

Abstract

Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realisable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.

Economic cognitive institutions

“…Hegel's view of institutions, as reconstructed by Crisafi and Gallagher (2010), has been recently used by institutional economists to explain the nature of institutions as constitutive parts of economic cognitive processes (Boldyrev and Herrmann-Pillath, 2013; Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev, 2014). Pivotal constructs in economics, such as that of preference, have been reconstructed in their ‘neither behavioral nor mental’ status (Guala, 2019) by analogically using Hegel’ idea of the passage from ‘Subjective’ to ‘Objective’ Spirit (e.g. Boldyrev and Herrmann-Pillath, 2013, Section 4).…”

Applying Experimental Philosophy to Investigate Economic Concepts: Choice, Preference, and Nudge

“…To focus on conceptual issues, I turn to philosophers of economics who try to explicitly defi ne what preferences are. Hausman (2012) provides one of the clearest conceptual analyses of preferences, according to which preferences in economics are total subjective comparative evaluations. 6 Th at is, they capture the agent's subjective rankings of available but competing alternatives aft er taking into account all relevant pro tanto reasons, which, jointly with her beliefs, cause (and justify and explain) her choice of one alternative over the other(s).…”

“…Th is contextual view implies, fi rst, that preference concept's defi nition can (implicitly) change as some axioms are modifi ed; and second, even taking all the axioms as fi xed, the empirical meaning of preferences may change depending on the domain to which the theory is applied by some correspondence rules. Guala ( 2017 ) also denies the dichotomy between mental vs. behavioral interpretations of preferences and proposes a third interpretation, according to which preferences are dispositions with multiply realizable causal bases. 8 Th is view is not behavioral because preferences may have mental causal bases.…”

“…In this domain (including consumer choice theory), the causal basis of preferences is most naturally interpreted as mental, as suggested by Guala's ( 2017 ) remve space…”

“…Th is move is based on the assumption that what preferences are in this domain depends on what cognitive scientists say they are. But some economists disagree with even this localized mentalistic interpretation of preferences Guala (2017). tries to dissolve this tension by suggesting that preferences are explanans for economists and explanandum for psychologists, that is, that economists explain individual choice based on preferences, which are in turn explained in terms of individual mental processes by psychologists.…”